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The quality and quantity of information flows is a critical factor in the command
and control of forces in battle. Many current simulations do not adequately show the
interactive effects of information on the battlefield. Agent-based simulation is a
promising technique that can provide insight into these effects.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an agent-based simulation to analyze the
relationship between information and command structure. SInBaD (Simulation of
Information in Battlefield Decisions) is the agent-based simulation developed specifically
for this thesis. Although SInBad is only an abstract model of combat, it is believed that
this approach can provide much insight into the mechanisms that affect the effectiveness
of information in battle.
Several combat scenarios are simulated using different control rules. These
simulations suggest that there exist scenarios where information is essential to mission
success and some cases where its role is less instrumental or even detrimental.
Other insights generated from this research suggest that agent-based simulation
may help define metrics useful in aiding decision-makers during the planning and
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A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
The increased emphasis on Information Warfare (IW) and Information Operations
(10) has produced innovative ideas in the application of information technology. There
is a natural assumption that an increase in communication is good but the validity of that
belief has yet to be tested. In the era of decreasing defense budgets, it is ironic that our
best hope for validating the effects of these new technologies lies in the technology itself.
Computer simulation can provide much insight into the effects of introducing enhanced
communications to the battlefield.
Of primary concern in this research is the relationship between information
capability and command structure. The structure of a military fighting force is
inextricably linked to its information infrastructure. If dramatic changes in this
infrastructure were to occur, the requirement for a corresponding change in military
structure would seem self-evident. Unfortunately, most current combat simulations have
difficulty analyzing information's effects on the battlefield. Differential calculus based
simulations (i.e. Lanchester based models) using aggregated data are too coarsely grained
to reveal the interactive effects of information, and information network modeling (i.e.
COMNET 3) analyze the physical effects on an information system but not how those
effects alter the outcome of conflict.
This thesis is the result of the development of the SInBaD (Simulation of
Information on Battlefield Decisions) computer simulation. SInBaD is a concept
exploration simulator created to analyze information and its effects on Command and
Control in combat. SInBaD is based on the precepts of Complexity Theory; a new
approach to looking at dynamical systems that develops complex behavior through the
interaction of its sub-systems.
With the help of SInBaD, this thesis explores force-on-force battlefield scenarios
in order to gain insight into how information affects the outcome of combat.
B. THESIS SCOPE
The focus of this thesis can be divided into two major parts:
1. The development of an agent-based simulation to model the effects of
information technology and related command and control structures on
battlefield engagements.
2. The modeling of those effects by manipulating information based parameters
and altering the composition and initial placement of battlefield forces.
There is no intention to accurately predict the effect of any specific information
application to any specific combat scenario. It is hoped that the results of this exercise
will provide general insight into the benefits and pitfalls of becoming a fighting force
heavily reliant on information technology.
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION
There are five chapters and one appendix that comprise this research.
• Chapter I - Introduction. This chapter provides a general introduction to the
focus of this research. The depth of the analysis and the organization of the
thesis are also covered.
• Chapter II - Background Research. This chapter explores current thinking
related to the application of information technology on the battlefield. A
short overview of current simulation techniques as well as a brief discussion
on Complexity Theory and related concepts is covered. Simulations based on
these new theories are also reviewed.
• Chapter HI - Simulation Overview. This chapter establishes the theoretical
foundation of the algorithms used in SInBaD. A detailed discussion of the
methods used to model information-based conflict is included.
• Chapter IV - Simulation Analysis. A justification and analysis of selected
cases comprises this section. Several combat scenarios are modeled to
determine what effect, if any, the increase in communication might have.
Valid ranges for simulation parameters are established and justified.
• Chapter V - Future Projects. This research is far from complete. This section
ponders the possible directions this research can go. Also, SInBaD is a
simulation in its early stages. A discussion of its current weaknesses and
possible fixes are presented.
Appendix - User's Manual. Complete instructions on the installation and
operation of SlnBaD is presented here. Source code for SInBaD executables
and other associated files are listed here.

n. BACKGROUND RESEARCH
A. NEW CONCEPTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE
1. The Role of Information in Battle
Information's significance in combat cannot be overstated. Whether it is to report
a battle's status to a commander or transmit his orders to the field, its quality, in terms of
timeliness and accuracy, drives command decisions that strongly influence the battle
outcome. The very structure of a military organization is constrained by its ability to
communicate. That structure is now experiencing fundamental change driven primarily
by an increased ability to communicate. This revolution in information affairs has
significantly impacted the U.S. commercial sector, providing a substantial profit
incentive to develop information technology. With the military unable to match
commercial research and development, they have surrendered the lead in establishing the
direction of this technology. Fortunately, many of today's military leaders have
recognized the need for change and have developed military concepts to capitalize on the
information products being generated in the commercial sector.
Several new initiatives are capitalizing on the increased role of information.
Since these new concepts helped generate the scenarios presented in Chapter 4, it is
worthwhile to briefly review them.
2. Network-Centric Warfare
Several initiatives under consideration view information technology as a way to
increase the tempo of battle. Vice Admiral Cebrowski has developed a concept he calls
Network-Centric Warfare. His vision is a departure from the stove-piped "platform-
oriented" thinking, which bases decisions on the abilities of specific platforms. Instead,
he envisions a force that is highly inter-connected through an information grid.
Engagement decisions are platform independent and rely on the total weapons capability
in-theater. [CEB97] Ring-of-Fire is an example of a platform independent scenario in
which a central authority controls fires from several platforms to support forces on shore.
Cebrowski's concept borrows heavily from the work of Brian Arthur, an
economist currently at the Santa Fe Institue. Arthur's theory of "Increasing Returns"
states that some products (those that require an extensive support base) achieve market
dominance if they can obtain an early foothold in the market. Arthur calls this "lock-out"
because the competitor is effectively locked-out of the market when supporting products
and a large consumer base establish the preferred product. The VHS-Beta war is a
classic example where customers chose the convenience of VHS early on. This gave
video suppliers an incentive to manufacture more VHS tapes, which in turn encouraged
more customers to buy VHS. A positive feedback loop is created that drives all the other
competition out of the market. [WAL92: 1:17-18]
Vice Admiral Cebrowski develops two complementary concepts to attain lock-out
as described in his Proceedings article:
• Network-Centric Warfare allows forces to develop speed of command.
• Network-Centric Warfare enables forces to organize from the bottom up - or
to self-synchronize - to meet the commander's intent.
Speed ofcommand has three parts:
1. The force achieves information superiority, having dramatically better
awareness or understanding of the battlespace rather than simply more raw
data.
2. Forces acting with speed, precision, and reach, achieve the massing of effects
versus the massing of forces.
3. The results that follow are the rapid foreclosure of enemy courses of action
and the shock of closely coupled events.
Vice Admiral Cebrowski's main point is that the "speed of command" of a
network-centric force is increased to the point where an enemy commander is "locked-
out" of pre-planned options, leaving only surrender or retreat as his only choices.
Ofmore relevance to this thesis is his assertion of the self-synchronizing ability of
the network-centric force. He also emphasizes the need for "bottom up" organization to
rapidly adapt to a complex situation.
His vision of a highly integrated mix of weapons platforms relies heavily on the
ability of an information network to deliver accurate and timely information to
commanders and targeting assets.
3. Operational Maneuver from the Sea
This concept, also known as Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), is a
significant departure from previous Marine Corps-Navy doctrine. [ST098] In the past,
the focus of amphibious warfare was the establishment of a large beachhead and
involved the shuttling of large amounts of supplies from naval vessels close to shore.
Operational Maneuver from the Sea eliminates the need for a beachhead by rapidly
deploying amphibious forces over a large littoral zone from ships positioned over-the-
horizon.
This concept expands the Marine Corps' idea of maneuver warfare out to the open
sea. Combined Arms Teams embarked on landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) and
advanced amphibious assault vehicles (AAAV) deploy with all the support they need to
attain their onshore mission objective.
The STOM concept's command and control mechanism strikes a delicate balance
between the offshore and on-scene commanders. The offshore commander conducts
initial vectoring of combined arms teams. Once forces pass a predetermined Line of
Departure (LOD), the on-scene commander has authority to control forces based on his
tactical picture. Again, similar to the network-centric force, speed of command and self-
synchronization are critical to maintaining the high operational tempo needed for mission
success.
New advancements in transport and weapons technologies will make
mobilization from far offshore possible, but it is the advancement in information
capability that will allow for the level of synchronization required to rapidly place forces
and fires on shore over a large littoral zone.
Maintaining battlespace awareness under a high operational tempo places a large
burden on the supporting information infrastructure. As forces come ashore, the tactical
scenario changes. Confrontation with the enemy, seizing objectives, and overcoming
known and unknown obstacles revises the operational picture. The STOM concept also
recognizes the importance of deception in opening gaps in enemy defenses that must be
exploited quickly. Coordination of fires from offshore is also a primary component of
the STOM concept and requires mechanisms for rapid target selection and continual
BDA updates. All this information will reside on an information back-plane that must
also be resistant to information warfare waged by the enemy.
Network-Centric Warfare and operational maneuver from the sea initiatives raise
questions regarding the ability for an information infrastructure to provide the needed
information. This thesis will attempt to provide justification for the reliance on
information and identify possible weaknesses inherent in the reliance on a network view
of the battlespace.
B. CURRENT SIMULATION METHODOLOGIES
Extensive research has been done in the area of combat modeling over the past
several decades. The fidelity of these models range from highly aggregated to finely
detailed. Highly aggregated models are used for budgeting, long-range logistical
planning and in studying theater level operations. Highly detailed models help analyze,
among other things, particular weapons platforms. All the models reviewed for this study
are problem oriented. In other words, they are designed to solve some problem. Whether
it is to help make budgeting decisions, determine the effectiveness of a weapons
platform, or to ensure that enough material is available to perform a mission, this type of
modeling seeks to find the optimal solution for a given set of requirements and a given
set of constraints. [MOR95]
In this function, conventional combat modeling can be very effective. Their
weakness lie in the their inability to explore the dynamics of warfare. The dynamics of
the conventional combat model are "built in" from the beginning. They are the
assumptions and constraints that arise when the simulation is first conceived.
Exploration of the causes of the dynamics is not possible when the simulator
predetermines them. J. Casti calls these models "prescriptive models"; they provide the
analyst with an explicit way to control the dynamics of the model, usually through the
adjustment of a variable or set of variables. [CAS97T8]
This is a fundamental difference between conventional simulations and agent-
based simulation. An agent in an agent-based model contributes to an overlying dynamic
by acting on its very limited rule set in conjunction with all the other agents. This
approach to simulation allows for the study of why certain combat scenarios yield a
particular result.
Another difficulty in the conventional combat modeling approach is its difficulty
in dealing with soft factors. Many combat theorists today recognize the significant role
of fighting spirit, morale, but modeling such concepts has been considered too difficult.
[ZIM98] Combat modelers are under increasing pressure to incorporate soft factors into
their models. Many low-fidelity models use a single parameter to account for these
factors but the resulting output appears contrived and does little to further understanding
of soft factor's effects.
Of greater concern, with respect to this thesis, is the methodology's assumption of
the massing of large forces that are endowed with perfect information and act in a
completely rational manner. As mentioned earlier, new fighting concepts being proposed
are based on relatively small groups of forces spread out over a large land region that
must operate on potentially limited information. It is clear that a new modeling
methodology is needed.
C. LESSONS IN COMPLEXITY
Before we explore a new methodology it will be useful to discuss some topics on
which this simulation is based.
The field known as Complexity Theory has received wide spread attention only
within the last few decades. It is more an approach to viewing dynamic systems than it is
a theory like that found in the physical sciences. Prior to its application, most systems
were analyzed using a reductionist approach. Decomposing systems into smaller sub-
systems, identifying and cataloging parts, and then decomposing yet again into smaller
sub-systems.
Neuro-biologists using this technique in their quest to understand the principles of
the human mind ran into a wall of understanding as they reached the level of the
individual neuron. How could the firing of electrical impulses between neurons generate
such complex behaviors? A fundamental point of Complexity Theory, and the one
critical to our discussion, is that the behavior of many systems is not derived from the
collection of its parts whose effects can be linearly summed, but is due to the interaction
between those parts acting with local information. Researchers are now postulating that
it is the complex interaction of several thousand neurons that produces consciousness.
[WAL92:5:145]
Dynamical systems that behave in this manner tend to be more capable of coping
in a fluid environment. Many systems, especially in biology, achieve this ability by
reorganizing their structure to adapt to a changing environment. These systems are called
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS).
John Holland, a principle architect in the field of complexity, identifies seven
attributes of CAS. He breaks them up into three mechanisms and four properties:
[HOL95:23]
Mechanisms
1. Internal Models - CAS use internal mental models to anticipate appropriate
actions to environmental inputs. These models are developed from prior
experience. Actions that yield beneficial outcomes are positively reinforced
in the internal model, while negative results of an action are negatively
reinforced.
2. Tagging - CAS possess a mechanism that allows for the identification of sub-
systems. This is important to allow for filtering and communication.
3. Building Blocks - CAS use this mechanism to identify situations that may be
completely novel. If a CAS enters a new situation, he may be able to
recognize some familiarity by identifying parts of the situation that are
familiar.
Properties
4. Non-linearity - CAS dynamics cannot be understood by the summing of its
parts.
5. Flows - CAS are made up of agents who pass resources or information
between themselves. An effect of an interaction may impact several agents as
the resource or information is passed through the system. This creates a
multiplying effect that is an inherent source of non-linearity.
6. Diversity - CAS are also characterized by possessing a wide range of agents.
This is true in biological systems, where Nature has determined that it is too
difficult to develop one super-agent to consume all resources. Instead, there
are many different agents, working in cooperation and competition, each
carving out a niche in the ecosystem. Diversity allows for simpler agents to
maximize all the available resources. [WAL92:3:1 19]
7. Aggregation - CAS are hierarchical in nature. Biological systems are good
examples. They are systems made up of cells, which in turn form organs that
are sub-systems of the larger organism.
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Table 1 is from A. Illachinski's 1997 report that accompanied the completion of
ISAAC, an agent-based simulation that is discussed later in this thesis. In this table, he
relates qualities of land combat to that of complex adaptive systems.
Table 1 Land Combat as a Complex Adaptive System
General Property of
Complex Systems
Description of Relevance to Land Combat
Nonlinear interaction Combat forces composed of a large number of nonlinearly
interacting parts; sources include feedback loops in C2
hierarchy, interpretation of (and adaptation to) enemy actions,
decision-making process, and elements of chance.
Nonreductionist The fighting ability of a combat force cannot be understood as
a simple aggregate function of the fighting ability of individual
combatants.
Emergent Behavior The global patterns of behavior on the combat battlefield
unfold, or emerge, out of nested sequences of local interaction
rules and doctrine.
Hierarchical structure Combat forces are typically organized in a command and
control (fractal-like) hierarchy.
Decentralized control There is no master oracle dictating the actions of each and
every combatant. The course of a battle is ultimately dictated
by local decisions made by each combatant.
Self-organization Local action, which often appears chaotic, induces long-range
order.
Non-equilibrium order Military conflicts, by their nature, proceed far from
equilibrium; understanding how combat unfolds is more
important than knowing the end state.
Adaptation In order to survive, combat forces must continually adapt to a
changing environment, and continually look for better ways of
adapting to the adaptation pattern of their enemy.
Collectivist dynamics There is a continual feedback between the behavior of (low-
level) combatants and the (high-level) command structure.
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Many military thinkers, Vice Admiral Cebrowski among them, have recognized
that combat appears to act like a CAS. [CEB97] Combat is characterized by a diverse
group of agents that act on internal mental models to carry out their mission. Information
and supplies flow through the system, and the effects of those flows are widely felt
throughout the system.
If combat is a CAS, then can we take advantage of that fact to help us understand
how the dynamics of combat are affected by changes in information and soft factors?
The next section will discuss some ideas that have developed, both in the civilian and
military arena, using this approach.
D. AGENT-BASED MODELING
What makes an agent-based model so different? Agent-based models borrow
heavily on a biological analogy. Biological systems are hierarchical in nature. The
human body is a complex system made up of cells that form structures known as organs
which, in turn, make up the structure of the human body. Entities, at any level in the
biological hierarchy, act on local information to accomplish their goals. Cells interact
with other cells in their immediate area, for example.
The premise in agent-based modeling is that many complex human systems
develop their complexity through this local interaction. The goal, in this type of
simulation, is to develop simple models for the individual agents in the level of hierarchy
of interest, and then allow them to freely interact using their internal models. Even a
handful of agents interacting can become extremely time-consuming to track using paper
and pencil. Agent-based modeling is still in its infancy primarily because the computing
power needed to perform this type of simulation is only now becoming widely available.
John Casti's book "Would-be Worlds" calls these types of simulations "artificial
worlds". [CAS97] They are worlds populated by actors that are designed to possess the
characteristics needed to adequately simulate the real life actors. The human controlling
the simulation is an omnipotent being, adjusting the parameters of his actors to see how
those changes affect his actor's behavior. The following are brief summaries of notable
simulations culled from Casti's book as well as the A. Illachinski paper.
12
1. Boids
Many researchers have been using agent-based simulation to analyze biological
systems. [CAS97:4: 13 1-182] These simulations fall under the umbrella term "artificial
life", a phrase coined by Chris Langton, the father of the field. It was at Langton's first A-
Life conference that Craig Reynolds presented his Boids. [ISA97] Boids epitomizes the
agent-based concept of discrete agents operating on a simple internal model and acting
on local information. Boids follow three simple rules:
1
.
Maintain a minimum distance from other objects (including other boids).
2. Match the velocity of nearby Boids.
3. Move toward the perceived center of nearby birds.
With these three rules, Reynolds demonstrated his Boids exhibit the emergent
behavior of flocking similar to that of birds. The flocking ability of the Boids is robust
enough to allow individual Boids to regroup even when a barrier is encountered.
Boids is one of the first simulations to demonstrate that a complex globally
emergent behavior could be generated from the actions of individual agents using local
information and simple rules.
2. Tierra
Many of the early pioneers in agent-based modeling were not computer scientists.
They were biologists and physicists who saw the computer as a tool to help them
understand their field of study. Tom Ray is no exception. A naturalist from the
University of Delaware, he spent 14 years in the jungles of South America before he.
decided that he could learn more about how animal life evolved by using a computer. He
realized that the evolutionary process that created life on Earth had a sample size of one.
Since it is unlikely that interstellar travel will be available to make observation of other
planets possible, he decided to create his own worlds on a computer. [CAS:4: 162-163]
Casti states that January 4, 1990 is the day the first non-Carbon based life was
created. This was the day Tom Ray's simulation, Tierra, produced digital organisms that
could self-replicate. Tierran organisms treat CPU time and memory as resources to be
competed for. Digital Darwinism is the mechanism of selection that determines which
simulated organisms will survive and reproduce. The organisms evolve and develop
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strategies to use more resources. Those organisms that can "hog" resources have a better
chance to reproduce.
The current version of Tierra is running on several computers across the globe. It
is accessing the power of interconnected computers to answer questions about how life
evolved on this planet.
Tierra is a good example of how agent based simulation can model complex
systems that evolve and adapt to new selection pressures without the explicit hand of the
simulator.
3. A Surrogate Market
In 1987, Brian Arthur and John Holland embarked upon the task of creating a
simulation that could capture some of the complexity of the stock market. They realized
that the current economic models used explicit models of human behavior which could
not accurately reflect the dynamic and sometimes chaotic nature that is known as
securities trading. [CAS97:2:77-81]
Using an agent-based approach, they modeled individual traders by giving them a
set of market prediction tools (forecast tools that are commonly used to assist securities
traders) and a rule base to determine which predictors they would use. The agents were a
heterogeneous mix with one group of agents preferring some indicators that other groups
did not.
Once the simulation was set in motion, no other input was added. The agents
acting on their prediction tools bought and sold stocks based on those predictions. The
resulting market behavior resembled that of the New York stock exchange. Instead of
smooth curves representing the equilibrium dynamics of traditional economic theory,
Arthur and Holland witnessed wild swings in the price of their stocks as the artificial
market traders made buy and sell decisions.
The Surrogate Market is a classic example of a simulation that was not designed
to find an answer to a specific question, like where is the stock market going next? It
was an artificial world built to help understand the underlying dynamics that is securities
trading.
Arthur and Holland's surrogate market demonstrated that agent-based modeling
can provide insight into human social systems.
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E. MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF AGENT-BASED MODELING
The Marine Corps strongly supports the application of Complexity Theory to help
define and refine the Maneuver Warfare concept that is the heart of their combat
philosophy.
With the help of A. Ilachinski at the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), the
Marines have developed an agent-based simulation called Irreducible Semi-Autonomous
Adaptive Combat (ISAAC). [ISA97] ISAAC simulates some aspects of land warfare by
using agents moving on a two dimensional grid in discrete time. Each agent bases its
move decision on a rule set that includes the agent's desire to reach an objective, return
to its home, confront enemy agents, stay close to friendly agents, and support wounded
agents. The strength of each rule is pre-specifled and can be changed during the
simulation to reflect a change in behavior in response to injury.
Although this rule set is more sophisticated than the one used in SInBaD
(SInBaD's rule set is discussed in chapter 3), it is still a fairly simple rule set and runs
very fast in simulation. ISAAC has demonstrated that it can represent emergent
battlefield patterns, such as aligning of troops and defending goals, which closely
resemble combat actions used in real land warfare.
ISAAC also has the ability to pass on sensor information from one agent to
another. By manipulating this parameter, G. Home at the Marine Corps Combat
Development Center used ISAAC to explore the concept of trust on the battlefield.
[HOR97] The research showed a significant increase in combat effectiveness when the
number of agents passing information to a deciding agent was increased.
EINSTein (Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulation Tool) is replacing ISAAC. Its is
pushing the boundary for agent-based combat modeling. Improvements to SinBad, listed
in Chapter 5, include many of the enhancements incorporated in EINSTein.
The Marine Corps' work with ISAAC was the inspiration for SInBaD.
Unfortunately, ISAAC does not provide the information parameters necessary to model
the effects of degraded information on the battlefield, so a new simulation is needed for
this research. There was also a philosophical disagreement with the agent logic used in
ISAAC. ISAAC agents make decisions based on a weighting of several different factors.
The agent processes those factors essentially in parallel. Current research on decision
making shows that most decisions are serial in nature. This is especially true when the
agent is given a limited amount of time in which to make a decision. [KLE89]
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Other agent-based modeling work being supported by the Marine Corps include
the simulation of the Hunter-Warrior exercise. Modelers at the Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) are using the SWARM simulation system, developed
by the Santa Fe Institute, to build a detailed model of the exercise that took place in
Twenty-nine Palms in 1997. Results are still pending but they are expected to further
validate the use of this technique in simulating diverse groups of forces spread out over a
large region.
Most work to date has been suggestive in nature. It has helped to establish causal
connections between certain measurements and battle outcome, connections that have
proved elusive to validate up to this point.
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m. DETAILS OF SINBAD
A. OVERVIEW
SInBad is a discrete-event, agent-based model of combat. Although it most
closely represents land warfare, SInBad is an abstraction that can only suggest trends and
is not intended to predict the outcome of any specific engagement. As argued in Chapter
2, this abstraction provides a powerful flexibility in the model without significantly
affecting its conclusions.
This research views combat as a complex adaptive system, that is, a highly
interactive system of agents that adapt to their environment. Although SInBad currently
does not have the ability to simulate this adaptive nature, (this issue is addressed in
chapter 5) it can still provide some insight into short-term engagements where adaptation
is not as significant.
The interactive nature of combat is another matter. It is posited here that this
interactivity is the cause of the rich non-linear nature of combat. In combat, agents make
decisions based on their perception of the environment. Those choices affect the
decisions of other agents since they make their decisions based on their environment as
well. The environment becomes a constantly evolving landscape. Combat is an arena
rich in complexity the progress and outcome of which can depend on small perturbations
in the initial conditions. It is the understanding of this complexity that is being attempted
in this thesis. Agent-based modeling of many agents acting on local information is a
good technique for understanding this interaction.
Information has a major role in this interactivity. If an agent bases his decisions
on inaccurate or old information, those decisions could be disastrous for the entire force.
A major focus of this research is determining when accurate and timely information is
important to mission success.
Developing the SInBaD simulator required the modeling of several different
combat phenomena, including information, command and control, and the behavior of
the combatants. The following sections describe SInBaD's basic combat environment
and the logic used in simulating combat.
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B. THE GENERAL SCENARIO
SlnBaD's general scenario consists of two opposing forces placed on a battlefield
of finite size. The combatants, represented on the display by the colors Blue and Red,
have different objectives. The Blue force is an offensive force and has a goal that can be
located anywhere on the battlefield. Reaching this goal is its primary objective and Blue
will move toward it unless it is engaged in combat with Red forces. The Red force is a
defensive force. Red agents begin the simulation by patrolling a predetermined sector
between Blue and its goal. They engage Blue forces when they observe them or when
fired upon. Blue and Red forces can be initially placed in up to three cells, each of any
size, placed anywhere on the battlefield.
Agents progress through the simulation in discrete time steps. A time step does
not inherently represent any particular unit of time. All parameters (i.e. offensive
capability, defensive capability, and agent speed) are adjusted to reflect a degree of agent
interaction that can be expected for a battle duration of at most a few hours. The
assumption of short duration battles eliminates the need to adjust the parameters to
account for the effects of fatigue and depleted munitions. Although these parameters
may be important in determining the final outcome of battle, they are not considered
significant in determining the relationship between the role of information and command
and control structures studied in this thesis.
C. SIMULATING COMBATANTS
1. Agent Parameters
Each agent in SInBaD is an abstract center of combat power. Agent parameters,
such as probability of being hit (Ph) and agent speed, can be altered to provide agents
with strengths and weaknesses relative to the opposing agents in the simulation. The user
is reminded that detailed, high-resolution modeling of actual forces in combat is not the
purpose of SInBaD.
SInBaD is not a Cellular Automata (CA) model. CA models place agents in
discrete cells and determine the value of that cell based on its surrounding cells.
[BAR97: 112-144] SInBaD uses an object-based model where each agent stores its
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knowledge of its world in a data structure. A decision an agent makes is based on the
information stored in its data structure.
Each agent has a sensor range of specified size, and views his local area with a
360 degree field of view. Agents make decisions based on what they see in this range. A
circular sensor range is used in SInBaD because of its ease of implementation. For the
purposes of this thesis it is not of great concern how the sensor range is modeled; what is
important is that information on friendly and enemy agents in the agents local area be
provided to allow a decision to be made.
An agent has an offensive capability measured by its ability to hit an opponent
(PA), and is given by:
P =
p h (} E d ) (3i)
A N
PA = Probability of a hit on a single opponent in sensor range
Ph = Probability of a hit at close range with only one opponent in sensor
range
Ed = Normalized distance to the enemy targeted (distance to enemy/total
sensor range)
N = Other enemy located in shooters sensor range
For example, if an attacking agent has detected only one opponent and that
opponent is very close to it relative to its total sensor range and its Ph = .02, then PA is
also equal to .02. This means that 2 percent of the time the attacking agent would score a
hit against that opponent. PA is inversely proportional to the number of enemy agents in
his sensor range and decreases to as the opponent reaches the limit of the attacking
agent's sensor range.
Being hit does not necessarily mean being killed. Agents have a defensive
capability parameter that specifies the number of hits an agent can take before being
removed from play. This separation of defensive and offensive capabilities allows for




















Figure 1 Agent Logic Chart
The type of combat envisioned for simulation when SInBaD was designed
resembles high-paced land warfare. There exists a large body of work on decision-
makers under these conditions and that thinking was incorporated into the design of
SInBaD agents (this includes research on the Object-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop
and intuitive decision making [MCD96]). Combatants in the heat of battle make
decisions under intense time pressures. High-stress decision-making in a compressed
time frame forces agents to rely heavily on prior training. They also are restricted in the
amount of information that is readily available to them. SInBaD agents are a simple
implementation that incorporates these concepts.
Two conceptual models help define the decision-making process used in SInBaD.
One model represents the flow of information. As depicted in Figure 1, information is
provided to an agent either through his physical senses or by some sort of
communications device. Each agent stores the location of enemy and friendly forces in
his sensor range in a data structure that only he has access to. In order to model bounded
rationality, the data structure has a finite size and can only store the locations of 10
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enemy and 10 friendly forces. Once the information is received, the agent, in accordance
with his predefined orders, makes a move and/or shoot decision based on the information
stored in his data structure.
This process can also be viewed in terms of a decision-making cycle known as the
OODA loop (Figure 2). For every discrete time step, the agent proceeds through this loop
collecting and processing information on his local environment. He then makes a
decision to move and/or shoot, and then performs the action.
Each agent performs two actions: shoot and move. Any time an enemy agent is in
his sensor range, he will try to shoot it. Whether or not a hit is scored depends on his PA .
An agent also makes one of four move decisions: advance toward the enemy, hold his
ground, run away, or head for a pre-specified goal.
Logic Flow Chart
Agent Decision Process
Time based iteration loop
Receives/Requests
Information










morale, and result of
previous decisions.
Moves in a particular
direction.
Shoot decision
Figure 2 Agent's Logic Flow Chart
This decision is based on what he sees at that point in the simulation. In the
"Receive/Request Information" step (Figure 2), the agent views his sensor range and
gathers information on the number and position of enemy and friendly forces. The agent
computes an Enemy-to-Friendly force ratio using equation 3.2, and performs one of four
actions:
Enemy-to-Friendly Ratio = [Number ofEnemy Forces/Number ofFriendly Forces] (3.2)
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1.
If the agent's enemy-to-friendly ratio is below an advance threshold value
(charge ratio), the agent will advance toward the average location of the
observed enemy.
2. If the agent's enemy-to-friendly ratio is above a retreat threshold value
(runaway ratio), he will retreat from the average location of the observed
enemy.
3. If the agent's enemy-to-friendly ratio is between the two thresholds, he will
hold his ground.
4. If the agent does not see any enemy agents, he proceeds toward the goal.
If a Blue agent does not see any Red agents, it proceeds to the goal. A Red agent
initially patrols its pre-specified cell until it encounters Blue forces. If it loses track of
Blue agents, it will loiter in the location where it lost track of Blue agents.
There is an affinity rule that overrides rules 1-3. It is a useful parameter that is
used to represent a level of coordination among agents. If the affinity parameter is set to
a value greater than 1, the agent will not follow the above rules until he "sees" the pre-
specified number of friendly agents in his sensor range. If he does not, he will move
toward the average location of the friendly agents he does see. This parameter has the
effect of preventing agents from running off on their own. As will be demonstrated in
the next chapter, a surprising amount of realistic behavior emerged from these simple
rules.
Another important benefit of this approach is the ability to incorporate softfactors
such as morale, fighting spirit, aggressiveness, discipline, and training into the
simulation. The charge ratio (rule 1 ) is used in this simulation as a surrogate for morale
and aggressiveness since it reflects an agent's willingness to attack based on an
assessment of his side's ability to fight. The runaway ratio (rule 2) was used as a measure
of morale and also training. It is reasonable to assume that a troop's decision to retreat
based on the proportion of enemy to friendly forces is directly proportional to the quality
and discipline of that force.
Blue forces differ from Red forces only in that they have a pre-specified goal they
must attain. This makes Blue an inherently offensive force and allows the simulator to
probe the advantages of offense over defense. Blue and Red force rule sets are identical
once agents have engaged in combat.
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D. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
Since the main focus of this thesis is to identify the value of information in
combat, how it is simulated is of great importance. SInBaD is a relatively simple
simulation and information passing is not simulated in great detail. It is believed that the
results generated when using abstract surrogate parameters as opposed to highly detailed
models of information can still suggest trends that can be explored later with more
detailed simulations. The advantage of this approach lies in its simplicity of execution
and its flexibility to broadly apply the abstraction.
Information is modeled as the agent's ability to perceive his local surroundings.
The presumption is that the agent has a sensor system that he relies on to produce a
decision-making picture of the world. This picture is equivalent to the agent's sensor
range. SInBaD allows for the adjustment of the quality of the picture an agent receives.
Information quality parameters can be divided into two categories:
1. Timeliness - a measure of how current is the information. Quality of
information degrades over time. Positioning accuracy of enemy troop
locations is a good example.
2. Accuracy - a measure of how precise is the information. Information that is
timely is still not very useful if it is wrong.
SInBaD uses an information update parameter to adjust the timeliness of
information. This parameter sets the number of steps between information updates. If it
is set to a value of 10, then 10 time steps will pass before an agent receives an update of
its position and the position of enemy and friendly forces in its sensor range. This means
that an agent with this setting could be making decisions on information that is up to 10
time steps old.
Accuracy is modeled by introducing error in the positions of agents in the sensor
range. If this parameter is set to a value of 10, then the agent will make a move decision
based on the location of enemy and friendly forces (including himself) that could be in
error by as much as 10 units. The error function is a uniform random distribution around
the true position in both the "x" and "y" direction. This parameter allows for a separation
between perception and reality; that is, what an agent thinks he sees from what is really
occurring. The effect of inaccurate information on an agent's ability to hit a target is not
directly modeled. It is assumed that inaccurate information leads to a reduction in an
23
agent's ability to hit a target. This can be accounted for directly by adjusting an agent's
Ph-
It is generally believed that you can never have too much high quality
information. As will be discussed in the chapter 4, this is not always the case.
E. SIMULATING A COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
Another goal of this thesis is to evaluate the benefits of having more or less
information under different types of command and control structures.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff defines Command and Control as:
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communication, facilities, and procedures
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
[JCS94:78]
The modeling of a command and control structure has been the most difficult
aspect of the simulation and as a consequence is the area that is most abstracted. For the
purposes of the SInBad simulation, Command and Control is narrowly defined to be the
initial placement of troops on the battlefield and the rules of engagement (including rules
of inter-agent communication) forces are expected to follow in combat.
SInBaD can model up to 100 agents on each side. 1 Each side can initially place
agents into as many as three geographical locations (a total of six locations). Agents can
be placed anywhere on the battlefield, and parameters of agents in that location are
independently adjustable.
Different command and control structures are simulated by the initial placement
of cells and the parameters used to define those cells. The decision to initially place
agents in a long row, a compact ball, or break the force up to create two separate fronts
* The number of agents was limited to 200 due to the lengthy run time associated with simulating a large
number of agents. Running the simulation with the 200 agent limit overtaxed the resources ofthe 200 Mhz
Pentium machine. It is not recommended that simulations of over 40 agents on each side be used. It is
hoped that later work will increase the speed of the algorithms.
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are examples of actions performed by commanders that can be simulated in SInBaD.
Commanders also control the mix of defensive and offensive capability provided to each
area of the battle.
Of great importance here is the level of autonomy with which forces are provided.
Highly autonomous agents act on their local surroundings with little regard to what is
happening outside of their area of influence. SInBaD's rule set contains an "affinity rule",
an overriding rule that prevents agents from acting on their environment unless they can
"see" a specified number of friendly agents in a specified range. This parameter, along
with the agent's sensor range, is used as a surrogate for the level of agent autonomy. An
agent with a large sensor range and a desire to ensure that many friendly agents are close
by defines an agent that has low autonomy, and vice-versa.
As reviewed in chapter 2, new force concepts provide more autonomy for local
area commanders, a force structure that is believed to be advantageous now that current
information technology can provide increased situational awareness. This hypothesis is





Before we begin the analysis of the combat scenarios modeled using SInBaD, it is
important to clarify some fundamental simulation methodologies used in generating the
scenarios.
1. Tuning the Simulation
A considerable point of contention in using an abstract simulation like SInBaD is
deciding what initial parameter values should be used when running simulations. Since
the simulation is intended only to indicate the results of a relative change in parameters
and not to replicate specific battlefield conditions, a little flexibility is afforded the
simulator. Still, with an arbitrarily set battle grid of 600 by 800, what does it mean for an
agent to have a speed of 2? It is clear the parameters in the simulation should not be
interpreted literally. Based on the literature reviews conducted there appears to be little
work done on determining how to justify numerical parameter decisions. [ISA97]
[AXL97] [WAL95] [SFI95]
The goal is to find a parameter space that yields results consistent with real
warfare. If SInBaD agent behavior is completely irrational or unexpected for a given set
of values then those values would be suspect. The approach taken for this thesis is to test
a range of agent parameter values on an attrition scenario. The attrition scenario is
defined as both sides having equal values for all parameters. This scenario was chosen
because it gives Red and Blue identical capabilities, an important factor in ensuring that
the change in behavior is due to a change in parameters and not the result of a relative
change in one side's capability over the other. Another advantage to using the attrition
scenario is that the behavior of real combatants in this scenario has been heavily studied.
[MOR95] It can be argued that no combat scenario is well understood, but perhaps the
attrition scenario comes closest.
Agent behavior for this scenario resembled behavior that would be expected in a
real combat attrition scenario (the detailed analysis of this scenario is presented in the
next section of this chapter). It became apparent after several changes in parameters that
the agents are remarkably well behaved over a large parameter space. Their behaviors do
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change, but in the direction one would expect for the change made. Response to the
speed parameter is a good example. When the agents' speeds are increased from 2 to 10,
their actions are more chaotic. Battle lines are not as smooth, often breaking up into
separate battles. More agents sneak by enemy lines, leaving fellow forces undermanned.
The behavior suggests that highly mobile troops need better coordination than slower
ones to prevent them from leaving the rest of the force behind. Instead of defining a
parameter space of reasonable values, the exercise only produced more questions for
further research.
In the end, the decision was made to tune the parameters to a range that met the
following criteria:
1. Provide a simulation long enough to allow for a large number of agent
interactions. The results of the battle should be decided by the 2000th time
step. This was important in keeping the simulation run time short.
2. Provide a simulation where the results of actions did not occur so quickly that
they could not be viewed. Although SInBaD has the capability to plot the
statistical results of several runs, most of the conclusions were generated from
watching the agents interact on the visual display.
3. Provide a simulation where the agent's actions are reasonably well behaved,
that is, reminiscent of well-trained forces. As will be shown later, well-
behaved forces in one scenario are not always well behaved when placed in a
different situation.
2. Winning and Losing and Risk
Determining when a parameter set delivers a "win" for Blue or Red is not as
simple as it might seem. Many engagements result in Blue breaking past Red's battle line
but only after receiving heavy losses. Every situation in real combat is different and the
commander must decide if the value of the objective is worth the risk of his assets.
The approach taken is to generate a statistics for value and cost. How well a
force achieved their objective is measured by recording the average position of all
surviving forces as a function of time. An additional metric for Blue is the tracking of
surviving forces that reached their goal. Combat losses over time are measured to
evaluate the cost of an action.
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A commander or planner is also interested in a scenario's level of risk. Many
scenarios appeared very sensitive to slightly different initial conditions, as well as small
changes in the information parameters. The variation in the objective and cost measures
resulting from a small perturbation in the initial conditions is used as a measurement for
risk. Changes in the objective and cost measures average values resulting from a small
change in the parameter space are also used as a measure of risk. The justification for
the use of variation in the above measures to measure risk, and the determination of what
makes a particular scenario yield high variations is the subject of the planning section in
chapter 4.
The research will be presented in these terms: objectives, costs, and risks. It is
left to the reader to decide if a particular action has enough value to justify the cost and
the risk.
3. Battles on the Edge
As discussed earlier, the difficulty in simulating combat is that many differential-
based models assume an equilibrium situation in which forces behave in a linearly
scalable fashion. That is, forces can be represented by an aggregated value of a smaller
subset of forces. A situation when this is a valid assumption is when the asymmetries
between opposing forces is great. It is in these situations that a small perturbation in the
parameter space will not lead to a disproportionately large change in the results.
These scenarios are uninteresting for two reasons:
1. Scenarios such that one side has a significant advantage tend to lead to results
that are expected and are not in need of simulation.
2. The trend in combat strategy today is to leverage information to compensate
for a reduction in force. This desire to improve the effectiveness of our forces
so that we can operate with even fewer of them seems to be a recipe for
staying far away from the equilibrium condition.
For these reasons, this thesis concentrates on scenarios where risk is great. That
is, the focus will be on scenarios where small changes in force structure and capability




The physical placement of forces in most of the scenarios considered is identical.
Blue forces are initially placed at the top of the screen, with a goal positioned at the
bottom. Red forces are placed in between Blue's initial placement and its goal. Red
initially is in a patrol mode until they see Blue. When one side sees the other, combat






Figure 3 Attrition Scenario - Initial Placement
The first scenario analyzed is a test case to determine whether the simulation
yields reasonable results under familiar combat situations. Since much combat modeling
is based on the attrition warfare scenario, it is the first scenario modeled. Table 2 shows
the parameters used for this simulation. Thirty agents on each side are given equal
defensive and offensive capability. The only difference between the forces is Blue's
desire to reach the bottom of the screen.
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Table 2 Attrition Scenario
Red Forces Blue Forces
30 Red agents in cell 1 30 Blue agents in cell 1
300 cell 1 box center x 300 cell 1 box center x
300 cell 1 box center y 100 cell 1 box center y
300 cell 1 box size x 100 cell 1 box size x
50 cell 1 box size y 50 cell 1 box size y
N/A cell 1 goal x 300 cell 1 goal x
N/A cell 1 goal y 500 cell 1 goal y
.01 cell 1 pk .01 cell 1 pk
2 cell 1 speed 2 cell 1 speed
100 cell 1 sensor/shooter range 100 cell 1 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 1 charge ratio .5 cell 1 charge ratio
1 cell 1 runaway ratio 1 cell 1 runaway ratio
3 cell 1 max hits 3 cell 1 max hits
The affinity parameter has been set to zero, meaning that agent actions are not
concerned with the location of friendly forces prior to attacking.
As the simulation progresses, agents form into lines of attacking agents (Figure
4). Even though the agents are acting in a completely autonomous fashion using a very
small set of rules, a complex and coordinated behavior results. This coordinated behavior
resembles that which might be expected in an actual battlefield scenario. The resulting
battle lines are reminiscent of World War I trench warfare.
Figure 4 Attrition Scenario - Active Engagement
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The attrition scenario gives some confidence that realistic behaviors can occur
with the simple rules used. Although this scenario is used primarily as a test case, it
yielded two interesting observations, one expected and one that is a little surprising.
The expected result is that neither force consistently obtains it's objective. Figure
5 shows the average Y location of the surviving forces as a function of time. The Y
location is an indicator of how far forces have progressed in the direction of interest (the
vertical direction).


















-Blue Average Y position
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Figure 5 Force Location Attrition Scenario
All time-based graphs plot the results of 10 simulations each using a different
random seed. Bars on the graph reflect one standard deviation from the average. The
large deviation from the average indicates that neither force achieved its objective with
any degree of consistency.
Figure 6 shows the losses each side suffered over time using the same simulation.
It could be argued from the results that it is better to be on defense rather than offense
since Blue casualties tend to be a bit higher. Clausewitz would certainly agree. He




In SInBaD, the causality of the result is buried deep in the interaction of the
agents and probably stems from the underlying driving pressure Blue forces feel because
of their ever-present goal. This subtle pressure is enough to place Blue forces in an
advancing position; otherwise they might have fled.
The more surprising result, especially considering the small set of rules, is that
forces do not fight to the last man. Most battles resulted in a turning point where one
side or the other decided to exodus en masse. This result is frequently seen in real
combat. With few exceptions, combatants do not fight to the last man. In reality, one
side will receive a certain number of casualties and then flee before reaching complete
annihilation. What factors lead to this turning point is a subject of hot debate. It has
been argued that training, moral, and even the rate of advance of the superior force are
critical factors.
Total C asualties
Figure 6 Attrition Scenario - Agent Losses Averaged Over 10 Runs
The explanation in SInBaD is again the result of agent interaction. There is no
master agent to call for a retreat when overall force structure falls below a specified
threshold. An agent in this scenario is acting with complete autonomy based on
observations of his local environment. Recall that an agent will retreat when the enemy-
to-friendly ratio reaches a certain limit. By chance, an area of the battle will reach this
limit for agents in that local area. Once they begin to retreat, neighboring forces see a
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change in the force structure in their sensor range and begin to retreat as well. The result
is a cascading effect that usually results in a complete force withdrawal. The retreat may
be permanent but sometimes a retreating force will rally and hold their ground. With
chance on their side, the underdog force can destroy enough enemy forces to begin
another advance and successfully obtain its ultimate objective.
This is an excellent demonstration of a feature of agent-based simulation. With
opposing forces so equally matched, small events that at the time seem inconsequential,
can significantly affect the course of battle. These results could only be demonstrated
using agent-based modeling.
It is easy to see that using an agent-based simulation, like SInBaD, could suggest
what factors might cause a hasty retreat. Unfortunately, that research is beyond the scope
of this thesis.
C. ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATION
1. High Tech vs. Numerically Superior
A primary focus of this research is exploring the relationship between information
and command structure. Proposed command structures such as those discussed in the
previous section are characterized by more autonomous control where commanders in
the field make the decisions. How much information should a local commander have,
and in what circumstances does this information benefit him?
We begin by defining a scenario. Again the battlefield is set up with Red forces
in the direct path of Blue's initial placement and its physical goal. Keeping with
proposed force structures, it is assumed that Blue is a more technologically advanced
force. It will have better communications and more lethality to compensate for a
numerical disadvantage. Red is a traditional force represented by the base case used in
the validation. One significant change for Red is that its affinity parameter was set to 5
to reflect a less autonomous command structure. The parameters used for the initial run
are listed in Table 3.
Blue force size is significantly the smaller (2/3 that of Red). To compensate for
this, Blue is given greater lethality (.03 Ph vs. .02 Ph for Red) and better mobility (4 vs. 2
in the speed parameter). Blue's runaway ratio has been increased to reflect better
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training. These parameters represent a modern, well-trained, highly mobile autonomous
force (High Tech) fighting a more traditionally controlled force (Numerically Superior).
The results (Figure 7) show that Blue's added lethality and mobility are not
significant enough to overcome Red's numerical advantage. Red consistently prevents
Blue from achieving its objective of reaching the Y location of 500. Blue also sustained
a significant number of casualties, losing approximately 1 5 of its 20 original agents by
the end of the simulation (Figure 8).
The question now pondered is: does increased local awareness (through an
increase in sensor range) improve Blue's situation? We call the above scenario case 1.
Case 2 only differs from Case 1 by increasing the size of Blue's sensor range. The first
attempt to give Blue an edge through information is to increase the its sensor range to
150, which corresponds to a 3 to 2 advantage in that parameter. As Figure 10 suggests,
Blue does perform better with the increased sensor range but not exceedingly so. On
average, they are more likely to achieve their goal and lose fewer forces in doing so
(Figure 1 1 ).
Table 3 High Tech (Blue) vs. Numerically Superior (Red) (Case 1)
Red Forces Blue Forces
30 Red agents in cell 1 20 Blue agents in cell 1
300 cell 1 box center x 300 cell 1 box center x
300 cell 1 box center y 100 cell 1 box center y
500 cell 1 box size x 500 cell 1 box size x
50 cell 1 box size y 50 cell 1 box size y
N/A cell 1 goal x 300 cell 1 goal x
N/A cell 1 goal y 500 cell 1 goal y
.02 cell 1 Ph .03 cell 1 Ph
2 cell 1 speed 4 cell 1 speed
100 cell 1 sensor/shooter range 100 cell 1 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 1 charge ratio .5 cell 1 charge ratio
1 cell 1 runaway ratio 1.5 cell 1 runaway ratio
3 cell 1 max hits 3 cell 1 max hits
5 affinity parameter affinity parameter
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Figure 8 Casualties for High Tech (Blue) verses Numerically Superior (Red) Case 1
What is it about an increase in sensor range that is helping Blue meet its
objective? Why isn't Blue's increased sensor range providing more of a benefit? Viewing
the agents in battle is necessary to understand the dynamics of the situation. In Case 1
,
Blue and Red forces have the same sensor range and they begin shooting at the same
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time. Traditional battle lines are drawn similar to that seen in the attrition scenario.
Blue's greater speed is not much of an advantage here since their forward progress is
halted by the interaction with Red.
With increased sensor range, Blue sees Red first and begins shooting first. The
range between 100 and 150 units is critical since, in this range, Red becomes the
proverbial "fish in a barrel". Red cannot see Blue when they are within this range band.
One would suspect that this scenario has all the makings of a route favoring Blue, and if
this condition were to remain throughout the simulation the battle would be over with the
complete destruction of Red forces.
Yet, when analyzing force losses for the Case 2 - 150, Red actually sustains
comparatively smaller losses over the Case 1 scenario, especially considering their larger
initial force (Figure 11). Blue's progress toward its goal, although better, is not ideal.
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Figure 9 Red Herding Behavior Case 2 - 150
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Red was able to get out of the proverbial barrel by adapting its behavior. In every
run studied, Red adopts a herding tactic, in which all the agents clump together into one
or two large groups (Figure 9). It is not quite clear why Red takes on this new herding
behavior. The affinity parameter was the first suspect since this was a measure of
increased coordination between the agents. When the parameter was set to 0, herding
still occurred but not as efficiently.
The tactic seems counter-intuitive at first since concentrating forces provides
Blue with one big target to attack versus several smaller targets that would seem more
difficult to hit. But concentrating forces gives Red an advantage by improving Red
agents' enemy-to-friendly force ratio in their local area. Since that force ratio is the key
parameter that allows agents to advance on the enemy, Red became the aggressor,
dissecting Blue forces and attacking smaller groups of agents in series.
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Figure 11 Casualties for High Tech (Blue) vs. Numerically Superior (Red) Case 2 - 150
Blue had the early advantage when it is shooting in the 100 to 150 range but this
is countered by Red's herding tactic. The disadvantage of Red's herding tactic is the
establishment of large gaps in Red's defenses that allows Blue to slip by Red and
accounts for Blue's improved progress toward his goal (Figure 13). Some forces are able
to slip by but on average they take horrendous losses because of Red's overwhelming
numerical superiority.
If increasing the sensor range to 150 is good; certainly increasing it to 200 should
be better, but this does not seem to be the case. Figure 12 shows Blue's progress toward
the goal with a sensor range of 200. Recall that a Blue agent's ability to shoot Red is a
function of the number of agents he encounters. With such a large sensor range, Blue's
ability to inflict much damage on a particular Red is reduced. Red still employs its
herding tactic and is able to get in close to Blue agents, preventing them from achieving
their goal.
2. High Tech vs. Numerically Superior - Conclusion
Figure 13 summarizes the 10 run average results of the three scenarios with
regards to Blue; the standard deviation bars were removed for clarity. The figures
represent Blue's progress for all three cases as a function of time. Numbers in the boxes
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represent the average number of Blue agents that have reached the goal by the end of the
simulation.
Position of Surviving Forces
Blue
-Blue Average Y position
-Red Average Y position
Red
Figure 12 Force Location for High Tech (Blue) vs. Numerically Superior (Red) - Case 2 (200)
Blue Progress as Function of Sensor Range
1 6 9 13 IT 21 25 29 33 37 41 49 49 93 67 61 65 69 73 77 91 99 59 93 97
Figure 13 Blue's Progress with Varying Sensor Range
Case 1, the sensor parity case, provides a clear advantage for Red. Blue makes
good progress in the beginning only because it does not see Red until it reaches 200 units.
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Once combat begins, Blue is repelled and takes heavy losses. On average, only 2.1 Blue
agents are alive and at the goal by the end of the simulation.
Case 2 (150) provides Blue its best performance against Red, both in attaining
its objective (7.8 of a total of 20 agents reach the goal), and reducing its losses.
Case 2 (200) shows a drop in performance in attaining its objective. Blue
casualties are light at first due to the larger initial distance from Red. On average, only 3
agents are at the goal by the end of the simulation. Red needs more time to reach a range
at which it can attack Blue, but eventually does and disrupts Blue's plans.
The results in this section provide some insight for actual combat. In combat,
more information has usually been considered advantageous but this scenario suggests
that more information can lead to a less than optimal application of force. Although it is
better to have more information than your opponent, there is a limit to the amount of
information a field commander can use. The number of targets a combatant can
effectively manage determines that limit. Recall that the agents in SInBaD are rationally
bounded and can only effectively process a limited number of targets (value is set to 10).
Although the exact interplay between bounded rationality and sub-optimal target
selection is difficult to assess given the analysis tools currently provided in SInBaD, the
data suggests that bounded rationality affects two important issues.
A commander in the field making targeting decisions should have some priority
scheme. SInBaD agents do not have a targeting prioritizing algorithm. This, coupled
with their long sensor range contributes to poor target selection. Targets with low
probability of being hit (i.e. very far away) are just as likely to be targeted as ones close
by.
Also, a commander should not be assigned more targets than he can cope with.
When more enemy targets are in range than can be effectively managed, consistency in
the application of force is lost. This is representative of an information overload
condition.
The challenge is to find the information balancing point; too little information
deprives the commander of an information advantage, too much can lead to information
overload and poor decision making.
Another interesting result stems from Red's behavior in dealing with Blue's
increased sensor capability. Red's actions suggest that herding into a powerful point of
combat power may be an effective counter to a technologically superior force. This
tactic gives Red agents a sense of physical superiority in their local area and allows them
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to "divide and conquer" the Blue force by focusing on small segments of Blue's line of
battle.
The data provides a caution for an autonomous force. Blue's lack of coordination
resulting from agent autonomy allowed it to be dissected and sequentially attacked. It
would appear that some level of coordination is necessary to prevent this from
happening.
If the future brings more autonomous command and control structures to the U.S.
military, an emphasis must be placed on providing the right balance of information to the
local commander and the right balance of coordination of all the local commanders.
One variation in the scenario, which was not discussed above, is worth
mentioning. That particular scenario reduces each Blue's sensor range to a point where
all Blue agents are essentially blind. The reduced sensor range causes Blue to ignore Red
as it proceeds toward the goal. The scenario is similar to a Blitzkrieg or lightning charge,
where the goal is not to engage the enemy but run past them. This can be a very effective
tactic only if Blue is significantly faster than Red, and the lethality of Red against Blue is
not great. Otherwise, it is suicide.
3. Application of Information Warfare
Results from the previous section provide clues to better preparing a smaller high
technology force by focusing on coordination to optimally apply firepower. Still, Blue's
performance with respect to obtaining its objective and reducing casualties could surely
stand improvement.
Information Warfare (IW) has been touted as a force multiplier. Proponents of
IW claim that its application provides a significant advantage by slowing down an
opponent's decision cycle (OODA loop). It is argued that the force with the faster
decision-making process can control the events of a battle, forcing an opponent to "react"
to your decisions rather than act on his pre-established plan.
To test these assertions using SInBaD, the quality and timeliness of information
(defined in Chapter 3) received by Red agents is adjusted. It is not the concern of this
research to determine the "how" of applying IW, the focus here is on the effects of
successfully applying IW. It is assumed that Blue possesses the capability to effectively
degrade Red's information.
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The agent parameters for both Red and Blue remain unchanged from Case 2 (1 50)
(see Table 3). The change is in the two parameters used to control information flow: the
update parameter and the position error. Recall that the update parameter determines the
number of time steps that pass before an agent receives an update on the position of
enemy and friendly forces in his sensor range. Position error determines the accuracy of
information provided to an agent for the purposes of making a move decision and is
measured in distance units.
Figure 14 and Figure 15 (compare with Figure 10 and Figure 11) show the results
with the information update and position error both set to a value of 20. It appears that
the application of IW is of little value. Blue's progress toward his objective is actually
impeded, not improved by its use of IW, and Blue still loses about half his force. Does
this mean that IW does not provide any benefit to the warfighter? Hardly: as with all the
previous studies, the time plots are helpful in determining if a set of parameters cause the
agents to achieve their objective but provide little insight into the dynamics that produce
the results.
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Figure 15 Casualties for Application of IW Case 1
When the individual runs are observed a pattern emerges that explains why IW is
not a successful tactic in this scenario. As in the High Tech vs. Superior Numbers
scenario above, Red agents herd into a few points of combat power (see Figure 9) and
effectively stop Blue's advance toward his objective. Once Red has halted Blue's
advance, the battle takes on a static nature where little movement is witnessed over
several hundred time steps. It is this static nature that makes IW ineffective. When the
change in the position of forces is small, IW has less effect because information
timeliness is less critical. Red forces are fed information that can be as much as 20 time
steps old, but Blue agents have not moved very far from their last known location so the
information still has some value.
If Blue is ever to break past Red, it must find a way to increase the dynamic
nature of battle. Several strategies have been tried including separating Blue's force into
two smaller forces, and attacking at different times, but the most effective strategy is to
increase Blue's aggressive nature. The attack ratio is increased to one, meaning that Blue
agents advance whenever they see an enemy-to-friendly ratio of one or less. Recall in the
previous scenario that a Blue agent must see at least twice as many Blues as Reds before
it advances. The new scenario also includes Blues use of attacking from two distinct
locations, effectively adding to the chaotic nature of battle.
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Figure 16 IW Scenario with Relatively Aggressive Blue Agents
The effect of both of these actions on the dynamic nature of battle is shown in
Figure 1 6 (compare with Figure 9). The new battle conditions are more chaotic. Red is
scattered over the entire battlefield by Blue's aggressive nature. With Blue's greater
speed, Red agents race to a location only to find no one there. This tactic effectively
takes those agents out of play. With Red's force dispersed, Blue can now attack smaller
groups while leaving Red's disoriented and ineffective forces behind.
Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the results using the new attack ratio and two cells
approaching from different locations. Blue's progress toward the goal is only slightly
impeded around time steps 6 to 21. Although Red's forces are scattered all over the field,
their average position remains approximately where it began, a testimonial to Red's lack
of effectiveness. The application of IW when the dynamic nature of battle is kept high
allows the Blue force to consistently obtain its objective with reduced casualties. Even
though Red has a significantly higher level of forces (a 3 to 2 favorable force ratio) they
are rendered ineffective and take on heavy casualties. Recall that the parameters used to
simulate IW do not affect an agent's ability to hit a target in his sensor range, only the
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agent's decision on where to move is affected. It is reasonable to assume that Red's
ability to attack Blue would also be diminished, further compounding Red's problems.
Position of Surviving Forces
Blue
Blue Average Y position
Red Average Y position
Red




R ed C asualties
Blue
Figure 18 Casualties for IW Scenario with Aggressive Blue Agents
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4. Application of Information Warfare - Conclusion
IW Summary of Results
N on-Ag gressive Blue
—Aggressive Blue w/ IW
Figure 19 Force Location Summary of IW Scenario
This IW scenario shows two important results. The first relates to the timeliness
of information and its relation to IW. The second result shows how to make information
more time sensitive.
The results of the previous section (Figure 19) suggest that the effectiveness of
IW is a function of the time-dependent nature of the information under attack. Combat
situations where the value of information decreases slowly over time is less affected by
delays. In other words, information can be thought of as having a characteristic time
length. Even if an IW attack degrades an information flow, if updates stay within this
characteristic time length, the attack will not be effective. When conducting IW
planning, the focus should be either on attacking sources of information with a short
characteristic time length, or in finding ways to make the situation more time sensitive.
Making a situation more time sensitive is aptly illustrated in the IW scenario
above. By aggressively charging Red's position, Blue is able to significantly reduce the
amount of time Red's information held value. Blue keeps Red on the move, never letting
battle positions stagnate. In order for Red to stay informed on the rapidly changing
situation, information updates must occur more frequently. Unable to get the
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information it needs, Red begins to lose situational awareness. The situation worsens
until Red can no longer track Blue forces.
The lesson here is that an effective way to make information resources more time
sensitive is to increase the dynamic nature of battle. Neat, predictable, battle lines are
easier to control than a chaotic, messy battlefield where forces are dispersed over a wide
area. New information technologies can allow forces to operate effectively on a chaotic
battlefield, but the data suggests that this force is heavily reliant on information to be
timely and accurate. If not, the valuable asset known as Information Technology can turn
into a disastrous liability.
D. A PLANNING AND REAL-TIME ANALYSIS TOOL
In the military arena, agent-based simulation is still in its infancy. Although this
type of simulation has been used to "suggest" possible cause-and-effect relationships that
lead to certain battlefield results, the real goal is to provide a useful tool to the
warfighter. During the course of this research, it became clear that simulations like
SInBaD had the potential to be a useful aid to combat decision making, both at the pre-
planning stage and in real-time to assist a commander actively engaged in battle.
SInBaD is currently too abstract and simple to serve this purpose, it is hoped that
more sophisticated progeny will be developed that can validate agent-based simulation's
potential as a combat decision aid. For the purpose of discussion, the applicability of
agent-based simulation as a decision aid is divided into 3 categories:
1. Combat Strategy Development
The scenarios discussed in this thesis suggest that the dynamic nature of the
battlefield can profoundly influence the information requirements of the fighting forces.
A fast, autonomous force can be effective provided is has the ability to keep the chaotic
nature of the battlefield high. It was also suggested that the application of information
warfare is more effective in the chaotic battlefield. These are just a few insights that can
be culled together to help develop a combat strategy for information age warfare.
Running more complex and realistic simulations can help identify parameters that affect
the dynamics of a situation, and thus the battle outcome.
This type of simulation can also be used to analyze many parameters other than
those related to information. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command has
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just such a goal with their Project Albert. Using the ISAAC simulation discussed earlier,
they are developing a multi-dimensional parameter space that can tie several parameters
together. A. Brandstein at MCCDC calls this technique "Data Farming". [HOR98] He
realized that data collected from actual combat experience is rare and questionable in
content when considering the extreme situations the data collectors are under. In order to
establish a new combat strategy, many more data points are needed. This is the same
problem that drove Tom Ray to create Tierra (chapter 2). Brandstein found his artificial
world in ISAAC, the simulation discussed earlier. By incrementally changing the over 50
parameters built into ISAAC, a fitness landscape can be generated that could provide
new insights like those mentioned in this research. As these computer simulations
become more complex, it is believed that it can become a valuable tool in developing a
coherent combat strategy and provide future military leaders with tools they need to
make decisions on strategy and acquisition.
2. Identifying Risk and Critical Linkages
A large number of factors, such as the number of troops, must be considered
when a combat plan is developed. Considering the number of variables that are
analyzed, it would be of benefit to have a planning tool that can identify which variables
increase risk if their values deviate slightly from the plan. If a battle plan is simulated on
a computer, it may be able to identify high-risk parameters. This risk may stem from any
number of factors including not having enough forces or other critical materials in a
given area to accomplish the mission. Error analysis is the tool used here to identify
these high-risk situations.
For this discussion, error analysis is defined as the process of measuring risk
based on the size of the variation in the simulation results. As an example of how error
analysis helps identify risk, let's assume that two scenarios provide a favorable final
location for Blue's average force. One scenario achieves that quite frequently as
evidenced by a small variation between runs. The other scenario also does well on
average, but the variation of the results is high. The conclusion is that the scenario with
high variation has more risk since the objective cannot be consistently met.
The latter scenario can also be characterized as highly non-linear. The term "non-
linear" has been bandied about in the current military literature to the point where its
definition has become vague. At the risk of muddying the waters further, it will be used
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here to define those scenarios that result in high variation in the mission objectives. For
it is these scenarios that are highly sensitive to small perturbations in the initial
conditions. These small perturbations are difficult to impossible to control. Attempting
to find the causality that leads to poor results within a single run is futile because it is the
result of the complex interaction between the agents in the simulation. In a highly non-
linear scenario, infinitesimally small deviations in the initial conditions can produce
surprisingly different outcomes. In order to reduce the risk, the initial conditions
themselves must be changed. If a campaign planner can identify when a planned
engagement exhibits this risky variation, steps can be taken to alter the scenario.
Another source of risk is critical linkages. A critical linkage defines a connection
between two missions that may prove critical to the success of the overall mission. The
analysis of critical linkages requires a simulation system that can model the hierarchical
nature of combat. For example, suppose a campaign plan consists of separate and nearly
simultaneous battles occurring over a large land region. This scenario is representative
ofthose discussed in the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver concept in chapter 2. Each tactical
battle can be simulated along with the interaction between battles. This multi-layer
simulation can help determine four-dimensional centers of gravity. These centers of
gravity are points in the battle where the success of one portion of the campaign plan
becomes critical to the overall mission's success. They are four-dimensional because
specific points in the battle may only be critical for a period of time. Good commanders
have relied on intuition to identify these four-dimensional centers of gravity. Agent-
based simulation could become a powerful assistant to help reduce risk by identifying
highly non-linear scenarios and critical linkages.
3. Real-Time Analysis
The battlefield of the future will be a complex one. Commanders will need to
assess an overwhelming amount of information, reach conclusions, and make decisions
in a compressed time span. Agent-based simulation could provide valuable assistance by
recommending courses of action and identifying four-dimensional centers of gravity in
real time. Imagine a powerful computer tied directly to sensors that provide current
enemy and friendly troop positions along with other combat parameters. This computer
is continually running simulations using the updated sensor information to predict
possible courses of actions and resultant outcomes. These computers can not take the
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place of a human commander, but they can provide an assessment of possible future
actions, and give a level of confidence of those assessments based on the accuracy of the
sensor information received.
Another potential real-time application of agent-based simulation is in identifying
high-risk areas as they develop. For example, a commander observing his troops in real
time could be assisted by a computer that analyzes battlefield patterns and other
parameters for the purpose of sounding the alarm when a segment of the battlefield has
entered a dynamic that is now heavily information dependent. The commander can now
focus on this segment of the battlefield and take actions to ensure that forces in that area
are given ample information resources.
4. Example Risk Analysis
To give an idea of how an agent-based simulation can be used to perform a risk
analysis, the attrition scenario is explored in greater detail. The standard deviation bars in
the graphs generated for this thesis have not received much comment because we have
not framed the discussions in terms of risk. Recall that the bars represent one standard
deviation from the mean. The large variation represented by these bars in some of the
previous simulations does not mean that the scenario must be run hundreds of times
before a conclusion can be reached. Scenarios that yield large deviations from the norm
(see Figure 5 for an example) suggest that the result can vary wildly with a small change
in the initial conditions. In SInBaD, there are two sources of randomness that make one
simulation run different from another: the initial placement of forces in their specified
cells, and the algorithm used to determine a hit on an opponent (see equation 3.1). Slight
differences in the initial placement of agents will alter their paths. This effect combined
with the randomness in the hit determination algorithm can lead to large variations in the
results. It is this lack of a predictable outcome due to small perturbations in the scenario
that defines the scenario as high risk.
The attrition scenario discussed in the validation section of this chapter is a good
example. The simulation uses the parameters established in Table 2 and results are
reproduced in Figure 20.
The attrition scenario's force position has a large deviation from the average
because there were several runs when Blue drove the Red force to the far end of the
screen, and there were several runs when Red did the same to Blue. From a planning
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point of view, this is a risky scenario and steps could be taken to reduce the risk.
Identifying situations of high risk and then determining actions to reduce that risk is
where agent-based simulation can be effective.
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Figure 20 Force Location Attrition Scenario
As an example of how a simulation like SInBaD can be used in this manner, we
will look at what can be done to improve Blue's effectiveness in the attrition scenario.
Keep in mind that SInBaD is a very abstract simulation. The results of this exercise are
not to be considered directly applicable to actual combat. Its purpose is to show how
running simulations can provide direction in planning and real time threat assessment. A
much more sophisticated simulation program would be necessary to provide meaningful
results to a particular combat scenario.
The goal is to find a parameter (preferably one that is measurable in the field) that
has a significant impact on the outcome of the battle. The attrition scenario is
characterized by static lines of battle and it was observed that changes in information
parameters have a smaller impact in these situations. One might suspect that the attrition
scenario would be heavily dependent on the number of forces in the field. Just how









Figure 21 Attrition Scenario with Variable Blue Force
Figure 21 shows the average location of the Blue force when the Blue to Red
force ratio is 28 to 30, 30 to 30 (original scenario) and 32 to 30. The results indicate that
this scenario is highly sensitive to the initial number of Blue troops. With the ratio at 28
to 30, Blue is consistently driven back. An increase of just 4 agents yields the opposite
result. The 32/30 scenario shows a smaller deviation from the mean indicating that the
result is more consistent than the 30/30 scenario, it is also a more desirable result. If a
more realistic scenario had yielded these results, it would be wise for a planner to ensure






Major advances in computer technology coupled with extensive research in agent-
based modeling are required to make this type of simulation a truly useful decision-
making aid. Developing and running simulations like SlnBaD and ISAAC generate the
insights that allow researchers to take the next step in attaining that goal. During the
course of this thesis, several additions to SlnBaD were contemplated that would make it
a more useful and user friendly experimental tool.
It is important to note that the Marine Corps is still supporting the ISAAC
simulation which is now in a follow on implementation called EINSTein (Enhanced
ISAAC Neural Simulation Tool). EINSTein continues to maintain the cutting edge for
agent-based combat simulation with many of the suggestions below already incorporated.
Anyone interested in improving SInBad or creating their own simulation is advised to
stay informed on the developments of the EINSTein simulation system.
A. USER INTERFACE
Considering the experience of the programmer and the time restriction inherent in
writing a thesis, it is no wonder that the user interface of SlnBaD is less than desirable. It
is recommended that future versions be completely encapsulated in a Windows
environment to include the following features:
1. Incorporate the input, execution, and visual display features into one
Windows based GUI environment.
2. Provide pull-down menus and radio buttons to insert input data for simulation
runs.
3. Provide the ability to save output results (both visual and statistical) to a
specified file name.
4. Provide tighter integration with Microsoft Excel to allow more flexibility in
the determination of measurable outputs and the better display of statistical
results.
5. Provide the ability to alter agent parameters while the simulation is being
viewed.
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B. INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND FIDELITY
Running the simulations created more questions than answers. The following
improvements go a long way to increasing SInBaD's flexibility and utility.
1. The current version of SInBaD runs very slowly when agent populations
reached 100. An experienced programmer should be able to squeeze more
efficiency from the original algorithms.
2. The agents are based on a single class called "squad". Separating some of the
functionality that is completely encapsulated in the "squad class" would make
upgrading easier. An example is the communications capability of the agents.
Objectifying this ability would make it easier to simulate specific types of
communications capability.
3. Discussions with several top simulation experts have made one point very
clear: simulation of a particular scenario is not possible without a terrain
model. A first iteration could be the addition of simple barriers and rough
spots to determine the theoretical consequences of terrain.
4. Providing a targeting scheduling algorithm to SInBaD agents would be a nice
addition and allow for the analysis of the interplay between scheduling
algorithms and the level of autonomy ofcommand.
C. ADAPTABDHTY
The modeling of any collection of intelligent entities should include the ability for
agents to learn from previous experiences. One of the biggest benefits to this type of
simulation is that computer simulated agents can learn and develop new survival
strategies that are not realizable by any other means. Computer programming techniques
like genetic algorithms can search and find "good" solutions in a continually evolving
parametric landscape. Tierra, created by Tom Ray and discussed in chapter 2, is a good
example of a simulation that provides a mechanism for competing digital organisms to
evolve and be rewarded for developing more effective survival strategies.
Providing agent adaptability not only helps in the understanding of current tactics
and strategies, but also will aid in the creation of new knowledge in these areas. Some
ideas for incorporating adaptation are:
1 . Incorporate a Genetic Programming algorithm. A genetic program is similar
in concept to a genetic algorithm. Instead of defining a fitness function for an
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individual agent in the simulation and then letting agents compete against
each other (the genetic algorithm model), a fitness function for the entire
simulation is created and individual programs compete. This makes more
sense since the goal of combat is not the attainment of an objective by an
individual actor but by an entire ensemble of actors.
2. The ISAAC simulation discussed earlier allows the simulator to set different
parameters for agents once they are hit once. A second hit removes the agent
from play. Although this allows for different behaviors during the simulation,
the changes are made explicitly. In keeping with the agent-based paradigm, a
mechanism that allows for parametric changes based on internal rules should
be developed.
3. Another mechanism for adaptation could be through communication between
agents. Agents could pass information (including erroneous information) that
would cause their internal rule set to be modified.
4. Agent parameters could be changed as a function of information quality. This




APPENDIX. INSTALLATION AND PROGRAM CODE
A. USERS MANUAL
1. Requirements
SlnBaD was developed and run on a 200 MHz Pentium IBM compatible computer
running the Microsoft Windows 95 operating system. Any computer capable of operating
Windows 95 should be able to run SlnBaD. 32 Mb of RAM was used for most of the
simulations but 64 Mb is recommended.
2. Installation
SlnBaD is not professionally written software and some effort is required to install it. It
is very stable and should run without incident once it is installed.
The SlnBaD simulation includes the following files:
1. Sinbad.exe - SlnBaD executable file*
2. datain.txt - input file*
3. data.txt - output file (created if not included)
4. Sinbad.tk - visual display script
5. data.xls - an Excel file which can be used as a template to develop statistical time
plots*
Copy all 5 files into a directory named Sinbad. If you want to view the visual display,
you must install TCL 7.5/TK 4.1 or greater. TCL/TK is a free scripting language compiler that
drives the visual display and can be obtained at ftp://ftp.scriptics.com/pub/tcl/7_5. Look for a
file like win41.exe.
Once TCL/TK is installed, go into the tcl\bin directory and copy the following files to the






The simplest way to run SInBaD is to build a SInBaD folder on your desktop and place
shortcuts to the files marked with a *. These are the files that you will be interacting with. To
place a folder on the Windows desktop, find a blank space on the desktop and right click on the
mouse. Go to New and then Folder. Label the folder SInBaD.
Once the shortcuts are in place, go to the shortcut called "wish41.exe", right click on the
mouse and go to Properties. If your target line reads "C:\Sinbad\wish41.exe", change it to
"C:\Sinbad\wish41.exe" sinbad.tk. Adjust your target line as necessary.
3. Running SInBaD
To adjust the input parameters enter the SInBaD folder you created, double click on the
datain.txt file. All user defined parameters for SInBaD agents are located here. SInBaD allows
for the independent creation of up to 3 Blue and 3 Red cells. To turn a cell off, simply set the
number of agents in that cell to 0. The following defines each cell parameter:
20 agents in cell 1
300 cell 1 box center x - initial placement of agents
100 cell 1 box center y - initial placement of agents
300 cell 1 box size x - initial size of cell in x-direction
50 cell 1 box size y - initial size of cell in y-direction
300 cell 1 goal x (Blue cells only)
500 cell 1 goal y (Blue cells only)
.01 cell 1 pk - defines probability of hit for agents in
that cell
2 cell 1 speed
100 cell 1 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 1 charge ratio - enemy-to-friendly ratio of agents
(see chapter 3)
1.5 cell 1 runaway ratio - enemy-to-friendly ratio of
agents (see chapter 3)
3 cell 1 max hits - number of hits an agent can take
before being removed from play
The following parameters are either not agent specific or control all agents on the side
designated in the description.
2000 run size (number of time steps) - sets the number of
steps the simulation will run.
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5 simulation speed (display mode only) - speeds up the
graphical display by showing only the nth step defined
by this parameter (has no effect on the agents
themselves. When simulation is in batch mode,
parameter is disabled.
80 Blue affinity distance (must be less than view
distance) - see chapter 3 for description
80 Red affinity distance (must be less than view distance)
- see chapter 3 for description
number of steps before Red receives an info update -
see chapter 3 for description
number of steps before Blue receives an info update -
see chapter 3 for description
position reporting error for Red - see chapter 3 for
description
position reporting error for Blue - see chapter 3 for
description
8 number of Blue around before attacking (less than
bounded rationality) - see chapter 3 for description
number of Red around before attacking (less than
bounded rationality) - see chapter 3 for description
flag for display (0) or batch mode ( 1 ) - a "0" generates
an output file (data.txt) that is readable by the
sinbad.tk script and will display visual results when
"wish41.exe" is run. When set to "1", an output file
is generated that is formatted to the Excel template
provided .
10 number of runs (batch mode) - sets the number of runs
that will be averaged to produce the output file used
in statistical analysis (disabled when display flag is
set to 0)
.
To run the parameter set you created, save your changes to datain.txt and run sinbad.exe
by double clicking the sinbad.exe shortcut in your SInBaD folder. The output file data.txt will
be generated, or written over if one is already present. If the "display flag" was set, double click
on the shortcut pointing to "wisb.41.exe" sinbad.tk to view the results.
If the batch flag was set, then import the data.txt into the data.xls Excel file. Note: It is
recommended that a macro be created to automaticallyperform this taskfor you.
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B. PROGRAM CODE
The following is all the program code used to develop the SInBaD simulation system.
1. Input File
20 Blue agents in cell 1
300 cell 1 box center x
100 cell 1 box center y
300 cell 1 box size x
50 cell 1 box size y
300 cell 1 goal x
500 cell 1 goal y
.01 cell 1 pk
2 cell 1 speed
100 cell 1 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 1 charge ratio
1.5 cell 1 runaway ratio
3 cell 1 max hits
Blue agents in cell 2
150 cell 2 box center x
100 cell 2 box center y
100 cell 2 box size x
50 cell 2 box size y
300 cell 2 goal x
500 cell 2 goal y
.01 cell 2 pk
2 cell 2 speed
100 cell 2 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 2 charge ratio
1 cell 2 runaway ratio
3 cell 2 max hits
Blue agents in cell 3
500 cell 3 box center x
100 cell 3 box center y
10 cell 3 box size x
10 cell 3 box size y
500 cell 3 goal x
500 cell 3 goal y
.01 cell 3 pk
2 cell 3 speed
75 cell 3 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 3 charge ratio
1 cell 3 runaway ratio
3 cell 3 max hits
20 Red agents in cell 1
300 cell 1 box center x
300 cell 1 box center y
200 cell 1 box size x
50 cell 1 box size y
.01 cell 1 pk
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Red agents in cell 2
cell 2 box center x
cell 2 box center y
cell 2 box size x
cell 2 box size y
cell 2 pk
cell 2 speed
cell 2 sensor/shooter range
cell 2 charge ratio
cell 2 runaway ratio
cell 2 max hits
2 cell 1 speed
100 cell 1 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 1 charge ratio
1 cell 1 runaway ratio











Red agents in cell 3
300 cell 3 box center x
400 cell 3 box center y
100 cell 3 box size x
30 cell 3 box size y
.5 cell 3 pk
2 cell 3 speed
100 cell 3 sensor/shooter range
.5 cell 3 charge ratio
1 cell 3 runaway ratio
10 cell 3 max hits
2000 run size (number of time steps)
5 simulation speed (display mode only)
80 Blue affinity distance (must be less than view distance)
80 Red affinity distance (must be less than view distance)
number of steps before Red receives an info update
number of steps before Blue receives an info update
position reporting error for Red
position reporting error for Blue
8 number of Blue around before attacking (less than bounded
rationality)
number of Red around before attacking (less than bounded
rationality)
flag for display (0) or batch mode(l)
10 number of runs (batch mode)
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2. Sinbad.tk script
# Program reads file data.txt one line at a time and
# displays it on the screen.












if {[file readable $ filename ] } {
set fileid [open $filename "r"]
set data [input $fileid]
scan "$data" "%d %d %d" step Blue Red}
set totalObjects [expr $Blue + $Red]
for {set i 0} {$i < $totalObjects } {incr i} {
set data [input $fileid]
scan "$data" "%d %f %f" col posx($i) posy($i)
set color Red
if {$col == 1} {set color Blue}
set tag($i) [.can create oval $posx($i) $posy($i) \




for {set i 1} {$i < $step} {incr i} {
for {set j 0} {$j < $totalObjects} {incr j } {
set data [input $fileid]
scan "$data" "%d %£ %f" col posx($i) posy($i)
.can coords $tag($j) $posx($i) $posy($i) \







3. SInBaD source code
Combat.cpp (main file)
// Richard Hencke - Thesis Project
//
// Purpose: Combat sim to model the effects of information and
// command and 'control.
//
// Introduction: It is the intent of this program to model the effects
// of information parameters on combat under differing command
structures
.
// This will be accomplished by using an object oriented
// approach. A class will represent a single entity of combat power.





// Later additions will include higher fidelity, adaptive
agents, and
// and an integrated GUI interface.
//
// Start date: November 10, 1997












enum flag {OFF, ON};
enum Shooter {NO, YES};
enum state {DEAD, HIDING = 0, ALIVE = 1};
enum Runflag {DISPLAY = 0, BATCH = 1 }
;
Runflag runFlag;
flag lethality = OFF;
int redAggressive, blueAggressive;
int runNumber;
void output (int, float, float, ofstream &);
int finalBluexl, finalBlueyl, finalBluex2, finalBluey2,
finalBluex3, finalBluey3;
int blueNumber, redNumber;
int redCelll, redCell2, redCell3, blueCelll, blueCell2, blueCell3;
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int randBlue;




int redBoxCenteryl, redBoxSizeyl, redBoxCentery2, redBoxSizey2,
redBoxCentery3, redBoxSizey3;
int redBoxCenterxl, redBoxSizexl, redBoxCenterx2, redBoxSizex2,
redBoxCenterx3, redBoxSizex3;
int blueBoxCenterxl, blueBoxSizexl, blueBoxCenterx2, blueBoxSizex2,
blueBoxCenterx3, blueBoxSizex3;





float blueSpeedl, blueSpeed2, blueSpeed3, redSpeedl, redSpeed2, redSpeed3;
float bluePkl, bluePk2, bluePk3, redPkl, redPk2, redPk3;
float blueChargel, blueCharge2, blueCharge3,
redChargel, redCharge2, redCharge3;
float blueRunawayl, blueRunaway2, blueRunaway3,
redRunawayl, redRunaway2, redRunaway3;
int blueMaxHitsl, blueMaxHits2, blueMaxHits3, redMaxHitsl, redMaxHits2,
redMaxHits3;
int blueError, redError;
// Simulation parameters are read in from an input file
const int BUFFER = 150;
char dummyBuffer [BUFFER]
;
ifstream inputFile ( "datain. txt", ios: in) ;
if ( ! inputFile]
{
}












inputFile. getline (dummyBuffer, BUFFER)
inputFile » blueBoxSizexl;
inputFile. getline (dummyBuffer, BUFFER)
inputFile » blueBoxSizeyl;
inputFile. getline (dummyBuffer, BUFFER)
inputFile » finalBluexl;
inputFile. getline (dummyBuffer, BUFFER)
inputFile » finalBlueyl;






















































































































































































































inputFile .getline (dummyBuf fer
inputFile » redCharge2;






























































































































inputFile . close ( ) ;
const int ARRAY = 100;
const- int REDARRAY = ARRAY;
const int BLUEARRAY = ARRAY;

























// Number of Red Squads
// Number of Blue Squads
// Maximum number of time steps
// in simulation
// initialized statistical parameters for all runs
float blueAvgXFinal [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float blueAvgYFinal [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
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float redAvgXFinal[BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float redAvgYFinal [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float blueDeadFinal [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float redDeadFinal [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float blueVarY [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float redVarY [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float blue2ndMomentY [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float red2ndMomentY [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float blueDead2ndMoment [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float redDead2ndMoment [BATCHARRAY] = { }
;
float blueDeadVar [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float redDeadVar [BATCHARRAY] = {0};





blueNumber = blueCelll + blueCell2 + blueCell3;
















if (blueUpdate < 1)
blueUpdate = 1;








cout « " Please wait while Blue and Red duke it out... " << endl;
for(int i = 0; i < runNumber; i++)
{
srand (time (NULL) )
;
// statistical parameters for each run
float blueAvgX [BATCHARRAY] = {0};
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float blueAvgY[BATCHARRAY] - {0};
float redAvgX[BATCHARRAY] = { }
;
float redAvgY[BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float blueDead[BATCHARRAY] = {0};
float redDead[BATCHARRAY] = { }
cout << " Battle number " << i+1 << endl;
// initializing Blue agent parameters























. viewDistance = blueSensorRangel;























Blue [i] .goaly = finalBluey2;
ptrBlue[i] = &Blue[i];
Blue [i] .viewDistance = blueSensorRange2;
Bluefi] .id = i + 1;
Blue [i] .speed = blueSpeed2;
Blue [i] .riskDistance = blueRisk;
Blue [i] .agentState = ALIVE;
Blue[i].pk = bluePk2;
Blue [i] .aggressive = blueAggressive;
Blue[i] . initialPosition (blueBoxCenterx2, blueBoxCentery2,
blueBoxSizex2, blueBoxSizey2
Blue [i] .charge = blueCharge2;
Blue [i] .runaway = blueRunaway2;
Blue [i] .maxHits = blueMaxHits2
Blue [i] .hitsTaken = 0,
Blue [i] .hitsGiven = 0;
Blue [i] .targeted = NO;
Blue [i] .shooter = NO;
Blue [i] .update = blueUpdate;
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Blue [i] .error = blueError;
for(int i = (blueCelll + blueCell2) ; i <
























. goaly = finalBluey3;
[i] = SBluefi]
;
. viewDistance = blueSensorRange3;




. agentState = ALIVE;
.pk = bluePk3;
.aggressive = blueAggressive;











redNumber = redCelll + redCell2 + redCell3;
// initialize parameters for Red agents




























































.id = i + 1;
.speed = redSpeed2;
.viewDistance = redSensorRange2;















for(int i = (redCelll +
ptrRedfi] = &Red[i];
redCell2 ) ; i <





































// Output program parameters needed to run the graphics simulation
if(runFlag == DISPLAY)
outputFile « RUNSIZE/simSpeed « " " « blueNumber « " "
<< redNumber << endl;
for (int timeStep = 0; timeStep < RUNSIZE; timeStep++)
{
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for(int i = 0; i < blueNumber; i++)
{
Blue [i] . timeStep = timeStep;
Blue [i] .blueDecide (ptrBlue, ptrRed, blueNumber, redNumber);
if (timeStep%simSpeed == 0)




for(int i = 0; i < redNumber; i++)
{
Red[i] .timeStep = timeStep;
Red [i] . redDecide (ptrBlue, ptrRed, blueNumber, redNumber);
if (timeStep%simSpeed == 0)







for (int timeStep = 0; timeStep < RUNSIZE; timeStep++)
{
float sumx = 0;
float sumy = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < blueNumber; i++)
{
Blue [i] . timeStep = timeStep;
Blue [i] .blueDecide (ptrBlue, ptrRed, blueNumber, redNumber);
sumx = sumx + Blue [i] .position. x;
sumy = sumy + Blue [i] .position. y;
if (Blue[i] .agentState == DEAD)
blueDead [timeStep] = blueDead[timeStep] + 1;
}
blueAvgX [timeStep] = sumx/blueNumber;
blueAvgY [timeStep] = sumy/blueNumber;
sumx = 0;
sumy = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < redNumber; i++)
{
Red [i] .timeStep = timeStep;
Red [i] .redDecide (ptrBlue, ptrRed, blueNumber, redNumber);
sumx = sumx + Red [i] .position. x;
sumy = sumy + Red[i] .position. y;
if (Red[i] .agentState == DEAD)
redDead[timeStep] = redDead [timeStep] + 1;
}
redAvgX [timeStep] = sumx/ redNumber;





for(int i = 0; i < RUNSIZE; i++)
blueAvgXFinal [i] = blueAvgXFinal [i] + blueAvgX [i]
;
blueAvgYFinal [i] = blueAvgYFinal [i] + blueAvgY[i];
blueDeadFinal [i] = blueDeadFinal [i] + blueDead[i]
redAvgXFinal[i] = redAvgXFinal [i] + redAvgX[i];
redAvgYFinal [ i ] = redAvgYFinal [i] + redAvgY[ij;
redDeadFinal [i] = redDeadFinal [i] + redDeadfi];
blue2ndMomentY[i] = blue2ndMomentY[i] + blueAvgY [i] *blueAvgY [i]
;
red2ndMomentY [ i ] = red2ndMomentY [i] + redAvgY [i] *redAvgY [i]
;
blueDead2ndMoment [i] = blueDead2ndMoment [i] + blueDead[i] *blueDead [i]
redDead2ndMoment [i] = redDead2ndMoment [i] + redDead [i] *redDead [i]
;
if (runFlag — BATCH)
fortint i = 0; i < RUNSIZE; i++)
{
blueAvgXFinal [i] = blueAvgXFinal [i] /runNumber;
blueAvgYFinal [i] = blueAvgYFinal [i] /runNumber;
blueDeadFinal [i] = blueDeadFinal [i] /runNumber;
redAvgXFinal [i] = redAvgXFinal [i] /runNumber;
redAvgYFinal [i] = redAvgYFinal [i] /runNumber;
redDeadFinal [i] = redDeadFinal [i] /runNumber;
blueVarY[i] = pow ( (blue2ndMomentY [i] /runNumber -
blueAvgYFinal [ i ] *blueAvgYFinal [ i ] ) , . 5
)
redVarY[i] = pow ( (red2ndMomentY [i] /runNumber -
redAvgYFinal [ i ] * redAvgYFinal [ i ] ) , . 5 )
;
redDeadVar [i] = pow ( (redDead2ndMoment [i] /runNumber -
redDeadFinal [i] *redDeadFinal [i] ) , .5)
blueDeadVar [i] = pow ( (blueDead2ndMoment [i] /runNumber -
blueDeadFinal [i] ^blueDeadFinal [i] ) , . 5)
outputFile « " Blue Avg. X Blue Avg. Y Red Avg. X Red Avg. Y"
<< " Blue Dead Red Dead Blue Var Red Var "
<< " Blue Dead Var Red Dead Var"
<< endl << endl;
for(int i = 0; i < RUNSIZE; i++)
{
if (i%simSpeed == 0)
outputFile << setw(10)
« blueAvgXFinal [i] « setw(13)
<< blueAvgYFinal [i] « setw(13)
<< redAvgXFinal [i] « setw(13)
« redAvgYFinal [i] « setw(9) « setprecision (4)
« blueDeadFinal [i] « setw(9) « setprecision (4)
« redDeadFinal [i] « setw(13) « setprecision (4)
« blueVarY[i] « setw(13) << setprecision (4)
<< redVarY[i] << setw(13) << setprecision (4
)
<< blueDeadVar [i] « setw(13) << setprecision (4)








// Output position to file
void output (int color, float posx, float posy, ofstream &outputFile)
{










// Base Squad from which Blue and Red Squads are derived
























// List tracks enemy and friendly agents each
each agent sees.
// Holds info on agents in viewing area
// Holds info on agents in risk area
// Identifies position of squad
// Holds value of position with error
enum State {DEAD = 0, HIDING = 0, ALIVE = 1};
enum Shooter {NO, YES }
;
State agentState;







// Currently established long term goal
// Currently established short term goal
// Distance squad can see







float pk; // Agent probability of hit
int detection; // Flag notifies agent he has been detected
int update; // Parameter denotes rapidness of info updates;
int boxcenterx, boxcentery;
int boxsizex, boxsizey;
float runaway, charge; // Enemy-to-force ratio parameters
int hitsTaken, hitsGiven, maxHits;






















void move (float, float); // Move to position identified by inputs
int randFunction (int) ; // Produces a random function with modulo
// of input
void initialPosition (int, int, int, int);
};
// Blue Squad class definition





position. x = 0;
position. y = 0;
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}void blueDecide (Squad * *, Squad * *, const int, const int);
void infoProcess ;
void surveyArea (Squad * *, Squad * *, const int, const int);
void riskArea (Squad * * , Squad * *, const int, const int);
void shootDecision (Squad * *, Squad * *, const int , const int;
// end BlueSquad
// Red Squad class









position. x = 0; (
position. y = 0;
}
void redDecide (Squad * *, Squad * *, const int , const int );
void buildArea (int, int, int, int);
void infoProcess ()
;
void surveyArea (Squad * *, Squad * *, const int, const int);
void riskArea (Squad * *, Squad * *, const int, const int);
void shootDecision (Squad * *, Squad * *, const int , const int]




#include " squad. h"
#include<conio . h>
#include <math.h>
// Red Squad functions
// Decide function is each agents OODA loop
void RedSquad: : redDecide (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,
const int blueTotal, const int
redTotal)
{
if (agentState == ALIVE)
{
// First step in OODA loop (Observe)
surveyArea (blueActor, redActor, blueTotal, redTotal);
riskArea (blueActor, redActor, blueTotal, redTotal);
// Second and Third step in OODA loop (Orient and Decide)
if ( timesteplupdate == 0)
infoProcess ( )
;
// Fourth step in OODA loop (Act)





// Survey area has Red agent looking around him in a circle of
// size viewDistance.
void RedSquad: : surveyArea (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,





// Loop scans for Blue forces in area defined by ViewDistance, places all
// that meet criteria in a list
for (int i = 0; i < blueTotal; i++)
{
float distance = viewDistance;
if ((distance = (sqrt (pow ( (blueActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow( (blueActor [i] ->position.y - position. y) , 2) )) ) < viewDistance
&& blueActor [i] ->agentState == ALIVE)
{
detection++;
if (blueViewCount < boundedRationality)
{
blueList [blueViewCount] . id - blueActor [i] ->id;
blueList [blueViewCount] .positionx = blueActor [i] ->position.x+
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randFunction (2*error) - error;
blueList [blueViewCount] .positiony = blueActor [i] ->position. y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
blueList [blueViewCount] .direction = blueActor [i] ->direction;






// Scans for Red forces in area defined by viewDistance, places all
// that meet criteria in a list
for(int i = 0; i < redTotal; i++)
float distance = viewDistance;
if ((distance = (sqrt (pow ( (redActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow ( (redActor [i] ->position.y - position. y) , 2) )) ) < viewDistance
&& redActor [i] ->agentState == ALIVE)
{
if (redViewCount < boundedRationality)
redList [redViewCount] .id = redActor [i] ->id;
redList [redViewCount] .positionx = redActor [i] ->position.x+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
redList [redViewCount] .positiony = redActor [i] ->position. y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
redList [redViewCount] .direction = redActor [i] ->direction;




// Risk area has Red agent looking around him in a circle of
// size by riskDistance. Risk area defines the range used in
// the affinity parameter,
void RedSquad: rriskArea (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,




// scans for Blue forces in area defined by riskDistance, places all
// that meet criteria in a list
for (int i = 0; i < blueTotal; i++)
{
if (sqrt (pow( (blueActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow ( (blueActor [i] ->position.y - position. y) , 2) ) < riskDistance
&& blueActor [i] ->agentState — ALIVE)
{
detection++;
if (blueRiskCount < boundedRationality)
blueRisk [blueRiskCount] . id = blueActor [i] ->id;
blueRisk [blueRiskCount] .positionx = blueActor [i] ->position.x+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
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blueRisk[blueRiskCount] .positiony = blueActor [i] ->position.y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
blueRisk[blueRiskCount] .direction = blueActor [i] ->direction;
blueRiskCount++;
}
// scans for Red forces in area defined by riskDistance, places all
// that meet criteria in a list
for(int i = 0; i < redTotal; i++)
if (sqrt (pow ( (redActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow ( (redActor [i] ->position.y - position. y) , 2 ) ) < riskDistance
&& redActor [i] ->agentState == ALIVE)
{
if (redRiskCount < boundedRationality)
redRisk[redRiskCount] . id = redActor [i] ->id;
redRisk [redRiskCount] .positionx = redActor [i] ->position.x+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
redRisk [redRiskCount] .positiony = redActor [i] ->position. y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
redRisk [redRiskCount] .direction = redActor [i] ->direction;
redRiskCount++
;
// InfoProcess takes the data obtained from surveyArea and Risk Area
// and determines average position of opposing forces. Based on force
// projections, it decides whether to run, attack, stay put, or continue
// patrol.
void RedSquad: : infoProcess (
)
{
float averagex = 0;
float averagey = 0;
float sumx = 0;
float sumy = 0;
if (redRiskCount < aggressive && redViewCount > && blueViewCount > 0)
{
for(int i = 0; i < redViewCount; i++)
{
sumx = sumx + redList [i] .positionx;
sumy = sumy + redList [i] .positiony;
}
averagex = sumx/ (float) redViewCount;




else if (blueViewCount == && targeted == NO)
{
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if (fabs (fixy - position. y) <= 5 && fabs(fixx - position. x) <= 5)
{
fixx = boxcenterx + randFunction (boxsizex) - boxsizex/2;
fixy = boxcentery + randFunction (boxsizey) - boxsizey/2;
}
}
else if (blueViewCount == && targeted == YES)
{
for(int i = 0; i < redViewCount; i++)
{
sumx = sumx + redList [i] .positionx;
sumy = sumy + redList [i] .positiony;
}
averagex = sumx/ (float) redViewCount;




else if (( (float) blueViewCount/redViewCount) > charge &&
( (float ) blueViewCount/redViewCount) < runaway)
{
fixx = position. x + randFunction (10) - 5;




for(int i = 0; i < blueViewCount; i++)
{
sumx = sumx + blueList [i] .positionx;
sumy = sumy + blueList [i] .positiony;
}
averagex = sumx/ (float ) blueViewCount;
averagey = sumy/ (float) blueViewCount;







fixx = 2*position.x - averagex;
fixy = 2*position.y - averagey;
}
}
} // end infoProcess
// Provides the corner points of Red's initial patrol area,
// function not currently used.
void RedSquad: :buildArea (int centerx, int centery, int sizex, int sizey)
{
upperRightx = centerx - (float) sizex / 2;
upperRighty = centery - (float) sizey / 2;
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upperLeftx = centerx + (float) sizex / 2;
upperLefty = centery - (float) sizey / 2;
lowerRightx = centerx - (float) sizex / 2;
lowerRighty = centery + (float) sizey / 2;
lowerLeftx = centerx + (float) sizex / 2;
lowerLefty = centery + (float) sizey / 2;
}
// shootDecision determines if the criteria is met to shoot.
void RedSquad: : shootDecision (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,
const int blueTotal, const int redTotal)
{
if (aggressive == NO)





if (shooter == NO && (targeted == YES ]| blueViewCount ! = 0))
shooter = YES;
if (shooter == YES && blueViewCount != && pk != 0)
for (int i = 0; i < blueViewCount; i++)
{
blueActor [blueList [i] .id - l]->targeted = YES;
float result;
result = pk*(l - (pow (blueList [i] .distance, 2) /pow(viewDistance, 2) )) ;
if ( (result/blueViewCount) > ( (float) rand( )/ (float) RAND_MAX)
)
{
hitsGiven = hitsGiven + 1;
blueActor [blueList [i] .id - 1 ] ->hitsTaken =
blueActor [blueList [i] .id - 1] ->hitsTaken + 1;
}
if (blueActor [blueList [i] .id - 1] ->hitsTaken >=
blueActor [blueList [i] . id - l]->maxHits)




} // end shootDecision
// Blue Squad functions
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// blueDecide is the OODA loop for Blue
void BlueSquad: :blueDecide (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,
const int blueTotal, const int
redTotal)
{
if (agentState = ALIVE)
{
// First step in OODA loop (Observe)
surveyArea (blueActor, redActor, blueTotal, redTotal);
riskArea (blueActor, redActor, blueTotal, redTotal);
// Second and Third step in OODA loop (Orient and Decide)
if (timeSteplupdate == 0)
infoProcess ( )
;
// Fourth step in OODA loop (Act)





// surveyArea has Blue agent looking around him in a circle of
// size viewDistance.
void BlueSquad: : surveyArea (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,




// Loop scans for Red forces in area defined by ViewDistance, places all
// that meet criteria in a list
for (int i = 0; i < redTotal; i++)
{
float distance = viewDistance;
if ((distance = (sqrt (pow ( (redActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow( (redActor [i] ->posit ion. y - position. y) , 2) )) ) < viewDistance
&& redActor [i] ->agentState == ALIVE)
{
detection++;
if (redViewCount < boundedRationality)
{
redList [redViewCount] . id = redActor [i] ->id;
redList [redViewCount] .positionx = redActor [i] ->position.x+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
redList [redViewCount] .positiony = redActor [i] ->position. y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
redList [redViewCount] .direction = redActor [i] ->direction;





// Loop scans for Blue forces in area defined by ViewDistance, places all
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// that meet criteria in a list
for(int i = 0; i < blueTotal; i++)
{
float distance = viewDistance;
if ( (distance = (sqrt (pow ( (blueActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow( (blueActor [i] ->position.y - position. y) , 2) )) ) < viewDistance
&& blueActor [i] ->agentState == ALIVE)
{
if (blueViewCount < boundedRationality)
{
blueList [blueViewCount] . id = blueActor [i] ->id;
blueList [blueViewCount] .positionx = blueActor [i] ->position.x+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
blueList [blueViewCount] .positiony = blueActor [i] ->posit ion. y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
blueList [blueViewCount] .direction = blueActor [i] ->direction;






} // end blueDecide
// Risk area has Blue agent looking around him in a circle of
// size by riskDistance. Risk area defines the range used in
// the affinity parameter,
void BlueSquad: rriskArea (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,




// Loop scans for Red forces in area defined by riskDistance, places all
// that meet criteria in a list
for (int i = 0; i < redTotal; i++)
{
if (sqrt (pow ( (redActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow ( (redActor [i] ->position.y - position. y) , 2) ) < riskDistance
&& redActor [i]->agentState == ALIVE)
{
detection++;
if (redRiskCount < boundedRationality)
{
redRisk [redRiskCount] .id = redActor [i] ->id;
redRisk [redRiskCount] .positionx = redActor [i] ->position.x+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
redRisk [redRiskCount] .positiony = redActor [i] ->position. y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;





// Loop scans for Blue forces in area defined by riskDistance, places all
// that meet criteria in a list
for (int i = 0; i < blueTotal; i++)
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if (sqrt (pow( (blueActor [i] ->position.x - position. x) , 2) +
pow ( (blueActor [i] ->position. y - position. y) , 2) ) < riskDistance
&& blueActor [i] ->agentState == ALIVE)
{
if (blueRiskCount < boundedRationality)
blueRisk [blueRiskCount] . id = blueActor [i] ->id;
blueRisk [blueRiskCount] .positionx = blueActor [i] ->posit ion. x+
randFunction (2*error) - error;
blueRisk [blueRiskCount] .positiony = blueActor [i] ->position.y+
randFunction (2*error) - error;





} // end riskArea
// InfoProcess takes the data obtained from surveyArea and Risk Area
// and determines average position of opposing forces. Based on force
// projections, it decides whether to run, attack, stay put, or continue
// towards the goal,
void BlueSquad: : infoProcess (
)
{
float averagex = 0;
float averagey = 0;
float sumx = 0;
float sumy = 0;
if (blueRiskCount < aggressive && blueViewCount > && redViewCount > 0)
{
for(int i = 0; i < blueViewCount; i++)
{
sumx = sumx + blueList [i] .positionx;
sumy = sumy + blueList [i] .positiony;
}
averagex = sumx/ (float ) blueViewCount;
averagey = sumy/ (float) blueViewCount;
fixx = averagex;
fixy = averagey;
else if (redViewCount == 0)
fixx = goalx + randFunction (10) - 5;
fixy = goaly + randFunction (10) - 5;
else if (( (float) redViewCount/blueViewCount) > charge &&
( (float) redViewCount/blueViewCount) < runaway)
fixx = position. x + randFunction (10) - 5;




for(int i = 0; i < redViewCount; i++)
{
sumx = sumx + redList [i] .positionx;
sumy = sumy + redList [i] .positiony;
}
averagex = sumx/ (float) redViewCount;
averagey = sumy/ (float) redViewCount;





fixx = 2*position.x - averagex;
fixy = 2*position.y - averagey;
}
}
} // end infoProcess
// shootDecision determines if the criteria is met to shoot,
void BlueSquad: : shootDecision (Squad * *blueActor, Squad * *redActor,
const int blueTotal, const int redTotal)
{
if (aggressive == NO)





if (shooter == NO && (targeted == YES I I redViewCount != 0) )
shooter = YES;
if (shooter == YES && redViewCount != && pk != 0)
for (int i = 0; i < redViewCount; i++)
{
redActor [redList [i] .id - l]->targeted = YES;
float result;
result = pk*(l - (pow (redList [i] .distance, 2) /pow (viewDistance, 2]
if ( (result/redViewCount) > ( (float) rand ()/ (float) RAND_MAX)
)
{
hitsGiven = hitsGiven + 1;
redActor [redList [i] . id - 1 ] ->hitsTaken =
redActor [redList [i] .id - 1 ] ->hitsTaken + 1;
}
if (redActor [redList [i] .id - 1] ->hitsTaken >=
redActor [redList [i] . id - l]->maxHits)






// General Squad Functions
// Functions used by both Blue and Red agents.
// Move function for forces with a given target coordinate
void Squad: : move (float newPosx, float newPosy)
{
if (position. x < 5)
position. x = 5 + speed;
position. y = position. y + randFunction (2*speed) - speed;
else if (position. x > 700}
position. x = 700 - speed;
position. y = position. y + randFunction (2*speed) - speed;
else if (position. y < 5)
position. y = 5 + speed;
position. x = position. x + randFunction (2*speed) - speed;
else if (position. y > 550)
position. y = 550 - speed;
position. x = position. x + randFunction (2*speed) - speed;
else
float step = speed; //stepSize;
float divisor = newPosx - position. x;
if (fabs (divisor) < .1)
divisor = .1;
if (fabs (newPosy - position. y) <= 1 && fabs (newPosx - position. x) <= 1)
return;
// if statement moves Blue closer to goal
float arcTan = fabs (atan ( (double) (newPosy - position. y)
/ divisor) )
;
if ((newPosy - position. y) >= 0)
{
if ( (newPosx - position. x) >= 0)
{
position. x = position. x + step*cos (arcTan)
;










position. x = position. x - step*cos (arcTan)
;
position. y = position. y + step*sin (arcTan)
direction = arcTan*180/pi + 90;
if ( (newPosx - position. x) >= 0)
position. x = position. x + step*cos (arcTan)
position. y = position. y - step*sin (arcTan)
direction = arcTan*180/pi + 270;
position. x = position. x - step*cos (arcTan)
position. y = position. y - step*sin (arcTan)




} // end move
// Places the initial position of forces for both Blue and Red






if ( (boxsizex ==0) || (boxsizey == 0))
{




position. x = boxcenterx + (float) randFunction (boxsizex)
(float) boxsizex/ 2;
position. y = boxcentery + (float) randFunction (boxsizey)
(float) boxsizey/2;
fixx = position. x;
fixy = position. y;
// General purpose random function generator
int Squad: : randFunction (int input)
{
return rand ( ) %input;
}
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4. Sample Batch Mode Output
Blue Avg. 13lue Avg. Red Avg. Red Avg. Blue IRed Dead VarBlue VarRedY Blue Red Dead
X Y X Y Dead Y Dead Var Var
274.719 102.446 300.536 298.636 1.933 1.697
272.6 158.7 301.8 298.6 2.105 1.412
276.9 215.7 301.7 292.8 2.22 2.62
288.9 266.6 301 291.2 0.1 2.953 4.603 0.3
295.1 293.9 301.9 298.1 0.1 8.975 6.205 0.3
290.8 300.6 297.7 300.2 0.1 0.1 13.51 7.873 0.3 0.3
276.2 306 292 301.6 0.1 0.1 10.45 8.301 0.3 0.3
256.6 308.1 285.5 303.3 0.4 0.2 14.11 8.925 0.6633 0.4
242.4 310 280.2 304.7 0.4 0.6 18.09 10.56 0.6633 0.6633
234.1 318.6 278.9 305.6 0.5 1.3 21.96 11.97 0.922 1.269
225.8 322 277 305.7 0.5 2.3 32.62 12.87 0.922 1.552
222.2 319.9 275.4 305.5 0.9 3 37.95 14.08 1.221 2
217.2 312.8 274.4 305 1 3.9 34.5 14.28 1.265 2.385
216.2 309.4 273.2 302.5 1.1 5.3 28.77 14.16 1.513 2.492
218.7 302.6 273.2 300.5 1.4 6.8 39.1 14.34 1.428 3 092
218.8 296 273.8 298.6 1.4 8.2 55.45 14.5 1.428 3.4
217.2 296.2 275.6 296.6 1.5 9.2 65.81 14.33 1.36 3.919
218 302.9 276.9 295.2 1.8 10.8 67.11 14.26 1.939 4.556
226.8 319.4 278.1 294.4 1.8 12.3 67.39 14.4 1.939 3.796
235.4 337.8 278.8 294 2.1 13.3 70.05 14.3 2.468 3.689
245.2 354.2 279.7 293.9 2.1 14.4 75.33 14.43 2.468 3.72
259.3 374 280 294.9 2.1 14.7 73.48 16.02 2.468 3.348
275.8 389.7 280 295.6 2.2 15.4 73.95 16.6 2.482 2 939
290 402.4 279.9 296.1 2.4 16.1 73.79 17.41 3.04 2.809
299 410.5 279.6 297 3.1 17 67.67 18.48 3.754 313
305 419.4 280.3 297.7 3.4 17.4 62.66 18.67 3.8 3 007
306.3 426.9 279.7 297.7 3.4 17.5 60.93 18.75 3.8 3.074
307.5 430.7 278.8 297.5 3.5 17.7 58.39 18.72 4.08 3 466
309.8 434.1 278.9 297.4 3.5 18.1 55.78 18.71 4.08 4 061
312.2 437.3 279.1 297.2 3.6 18.1 54.91 18.69 4.03 4.061
312.5 440.2 278.7 297 3.6 18.3 54.62 18.78 4.03 4 383
312 442.9 278.1 296.5 3.6 18.5 54.22 18.83 4.03 4 365
309.3 442.1 278 296.5 3.7 18.9 55.61 18.91 4.001 4 742
307 444.6 278 296.5 3.7 19.1 54.33 19.12 4.001 5 108
304.5 448 278 296.5 3.7 19.2 50.76 19.31 4.001 5.307
303.3 451.1 277.8 296.3 3.7 19.2 48.88 19.26 4.001 5 307
302.5 453.4 278 296.1 3.7 19.2 48.99 19.1 4.001 5 307
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